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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Responsibility in investing has become hugely popular; according to some estimates almost one 
fourth of all wealth under professional management is invested following some kind of a socially 
responsible investing (SRI) strategy (Singh, 2018). Initially, the core idea of responsible investing 
was to avoid investing in companies that operate in undesirable industries such as tobacco, alcohol 
or weapons, also known as “negative screening”, but nowadays it can also include what is known 
as “positive screening” i.e. emphasizing investing in companies that operate in industries 
generally regarded as good such as green energy or recycling (Combs, 2014).  
ESG investing i.e. considering environmental, social and governance factors in investment risk 
analysis is a more sophisticated form of responsible investing than simple screening strategies. It 
has also gained huge momentum; in Europe the use of ESG integration strategies have grown at 
a CAGR of 27 % between 2015 and 2017 measured in total assets under management (Eurosif, 
2018). Furthermore, the growth is only expected to continue as the European Union’s 
Commission has set out an agenda for creating a common ESG framework and measurement 
system for all professional investors in Europe. Disclosing how ESG factors are considered in the 
risk analysis process will become part of obligatory regulation for institutional investors and asset 
managers and it is expected to take effect already in 2020 (European Commission, 2018). 
What is the driver behind these trends? Why are investment banks and wealth managers suddenly 
so interested in sustainability and social issues? First of all, people are becoming more and more 
aware of the gravity of the environmental and social issues we face and the negative effects they 
have on the planet and our lives. Secondly, it has become widely accepted that the complex and 
even wicked environmental and social challenges we face cannot be solved solely by philanthropy 
or governmental funding – market forces need to be included in some way (Bell, 2013; Jackson, 
2013).  
This thinking applies especially to the younger generations: according to a study conducted by 
Deloitte (2018), 39 % of millennials think that one of the main objectives of business should be 
to improve society and 33 % feel that businesses should aim to protect the environment while 
only 24 % responded that generating profits should be the main goal. Thus, as the younger 
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generations slowly gain control over the world’s total wealth, bankers and fund managers are 
suddenly facing an increasing demand for responsible investing from their investors who want 
that their investments generate some positive societal impacts instead of great financial returns 
only (Ernst & Young, 2017). 
Last, but not least by any means, the interest in responsible investing has been increased by recent 
studies that have indicated that responsibility and sustainability can in fact improve financial 
performance. It has been shown in many studies that integrating ESG factors into investment 
decision-making outperforms non-ESG strategies, and that considering ESG factors through 
active ownership improves target companies’ operational performance, increases stock prices and 
reduces risks (Clark, Feiner, & Viehs, 2015). 
Another way to look at the profitability of responsible and sustainable investing, is to think of the 
risks and opportunities presented by environmental and social issues. As stated in the European 
Commission’s Action Plan on sustainable finance (European Commission, 2018) climate change 
already causes huge financial losses to companies in the form of natural disasters, which will 
decrease their profitability in the long-run. Thus, it is clear that mitigating these environmental 
risks is crucial, but also that the companies not only mitigating risks but actually taking advantage 
of the business possibilities by solving these issues have huge potential in terms of financial 
upsides. That is where impact investors step in. 
The term impact investing was originally coined in 2007 at an event organized by the Rockefeller 
foundation’s initiative where some of the world’s leaders in finance, philanthropy and 
development gathered together with the aim of figuring out new ways to use investments for 
social and environmental good (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014; World Economic Forum, 2013). 
Since then, there has been much talk about impact investing among practitioners and academics 
alike and the idea has gained good traction. According to the Global Impact Investing Network 
(GIIN), impact investing has grown rapidly to be a USD 502 billion industry and has been 
growing with a CAGR of 61 % in 5 years as can be seen in Figure 1 (Mudaliar, Schiff, & Bass, 
2016; Mudaliar, Schiff, Bass, & Dithrich, 2017; Mudaliar, Bass, & Dithrich, 2018; Mudaliar, 
Bass, Nova, & Dithrich, 2019; Saltuk, El Idrissi, Bouri, Mudaliar, & Schiff, 2014; Saltuk, El 
Idrissi, Bouri, Mudalier, & Schiff, 2015). Therefore, some of the most conservative estimates 
stating that impact investing could become a USD 400 billion industry by 2020 have already been 
surpassed and based on this growth trend, the bolder estimates stating that impact investing is on 
track to become a USD 1 trillion industry by 2020, may well be realized (O'Donohoe, 
Leijonhufvud, Saltuk, Bugg-Levine, & Brandenburg, 2010). 
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However, despite the remarkable growth in the past, there are still some challenges to overcome 
in order to enable that growth track to continue. First of all, there is some terminological 
ambiguity regarding the definition of impact investing and what it stands for (Höchstädter & 
Scheck, 2014; Mendell & Barbosa, 2013). Because of the lack of a uniform definition related 
terms, such as responsible investing, are sometimes used interchangeably with impact investing 
(Harji & Jackson, 2012).  
Secondly, it is clear that the challenges of modelling and measuring impact have not been solved 
yet, as they continue to be a hot topic in the impact investing industry in more ways than one; 
impact measurement is simultaneously where most of the criticism seems to be aimed at as well 
as where most of the development efforts take place. The critics say that measuring diverse social 
and environmental impacts in different environments in a comparable way is simply impossible 
(Kroeger & Weber, 2014). On the other hand, many major actors in the financial sector such as 
the World Economic Forum, the Global Impact Investing Network and the Impact Management 
Project are currently making great efforts to bring the measuring of impact to a good standardized 
level (Reisman & Olazabal, 2016; Ruff & Olsen, 2018). 
 
Figure 1. Impact investing assets under management (AUM) globally in 2013-2017 (Mudaliar et 
al., 2016; Mudaliar et al., 2017; Mudaliar et al., 2018; Mudaliar et al., 2019; Saltuk et al., 2014; 
Saltuk et al., 2015) 
A third controversial topic in impact investing is that of the financial returns. The proponents of 
impact investing claim that striving for impact does not mean sacrificing financial returns but that 
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in fact it can even increase them (Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein, 2011). Many however, refuse to 
believe that such a correlation could exist and instead assert that achieving impact can only be 
done by compromising profits (Cheng, 2011; Evans, 2013; Mitchell, Kingston, & Goodall, 2008). 
All in all, it can be said that impact investing is a nascent industry that has gained incredible 
traction and growth in the past decade. It follows and further develops the ideas previously related 
to concepts such as responsible investing and ESG investing and can therefore be viewed as the 
next step of the evolution in the trend of sustainability in financing. However, there are still many 
challenges to be resolved especially in terms of definition, measuring and profitability. This study 
addresses these existing challenges and aims to provide answers to them in order to promote the 
development of the impact investing industry.  
1.2 Research objective and questions 
The general objective of this study is to produce useful knowledge and benchmarking data about 
impact investing that could help advance and grow the industry. More specifically, the aim is to 
find out how impact investors currently carry out their activities in private equity, which methods 
and practices they use and ultimately which of them lead to the best results both in terms of impact 
and financial returns. 
However, in order to be able to produce benchmarking data, the definition of impact investing 
needs to be clarified first. According to the latest Annual Impact Investor Survey by GIIN, 77 % 
of the respondents think that the lack of a common understanding and segmentation of impact 
investing is a significant or moderate challenge to the industry’s growth (Mudaliar et al., 2019). 
Höchstädter and Scheck (2014) conclude in their assessment of academics and impact investing 
practitioners that there is indeed some confusion between impact investing and related concepts 
such as responsible investing and themed investments. However, they also note that regarding the 
core elements of impact investing, there is actually less disagreement than expected (Höchstädter 
& Scheck, 2014). Still, as the impact investing industry is constantly developing, the 
understanding of the term, especially by practitioners, has most likely evolved and maybe 
converged more in the past few years. Therefore, the topic merits further research. 
(1) How is impact investing defined by practitioners? How does it relate to and differ from 
related concepts such as socially responsible investing and ESG investing? 
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A common topic of debate regarding the definition of impact investing is the profitability of it: 
can investors generate market rate returns while also helping people or the environment? Some 
claim that is impossible to make money while having a real impact (Cheng, 2011; Evans, 2013; 
Mitchell et al., 2008), while others state that in the right business models positive impacts and 
profit in fact correlate (Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein, 2011). Thus, it is interesting to study, what 
kind of financial targets do impact investors have and do they have to compromise on profits in 
order to achieve positive impact. 
In addition to financial targets, the impact targets are also an interesting topic of research. Initially 
impact investing was mostly associated with social impacts and the environmental aspect was 
taken into account only later on. According to my knowledge, the specific impact targets that 
investors have, have not been studied previously and the share of socially focused and 
environmentally focused investors has not been studied. Thus, the impact targets of impact 
investors form an interesting research question along with the financial targets.  
(2) What kinds of financial targets and impact targets do private equity impact investors 
have? Are they willing to compromise on profits? 
The evident impact modelling and measurement challenges are clearly also interesting and 
relevant topics to study further. According to the Annual Impact Investor Survey by GIIN, 75 % 
of the respondents think that the lack of sophistication in measurement practices of impact 
investing is a significant or moderate challenge to the industry’s growth (Mudaliar et al., 2019). 
Many academics even claim that measuring different impacts in different environments in a 
comparable way is an impossible task (Kroeger & Weber, 2014). 
It is evident that there are still a lot of open questions and challenges in the field of impact 
measurement. Finding out how impact investors measure and model their impact and what 
benefits and drawbacks the different methods have, would be a useful benchmark and starting 
point for budding impact investors. 
(3) What methods of impact modelling and impact measurement are used by private equity 
impact investors and how satisfied are they with them?  
In addition to modelling and measuring, Höchstädter and Scheck (2014) note that there is still 
room for future research in studying the practicalities of impact investing more closely. In their 
opinion, interesting research topics could be for example how are the impact business models 
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assessed and what constitutes as an investable business model, how do the impact investors gain 
their share of the profits and how is risk management handled. 
The challenge is of course that these practicalities depend largely on the asset class that is used to 
conduct impact investments. While social impact bonds (SIB) and other asset classes used in 
impact investing have been studied to some extent (Liang, Mansberger, & Spieler, 2014; 
Männistö, 2016), interestingly enough, private equity, the most commonly used asset class by 
impact investors (Mudaliar et al., 2018) has not gained similar dedicated research. Furthermore, 
as the private equity industry has some unique characteristics stemming from the LP-GP structure 
and the distribution of profits among them (Fenn, 1996), it is especially interesting to study how 
impact investing is executed in practice through private equity funds.  
(4) What are the challenges related to LP-GP relationships in private equity impact funds 
and how is profit sharing arranged? 
Finally, it is of course interesting to know how all of these factors affect the performance of a 
private equity impact fund, both in terms of financial returns and impacts achieved. Are there 
some measurement or modelling methods that lead to improved results or can additional impact 
be achieved by clever incentivizing? These questions have not been studied before and therefore 
they are the topic of the fifth research question of this study. 
(5) How do targets, modelling and measurement methods and GP compensation structures 
affect the financial and impact performance of an impact investing fund? 
Table 1. Research questions 
No. Question 
1 How is impact investing defined? How does it relate to and differ from related concepts such as 
socially responsible investing and ESG investing? 
2 
 
 
 
What kinds of financial targets and impact targets do private equity impact investors have? Are 
they willing to compromise on profits? 
3 What methods of impact modelling and impact measurement are used by private equity impact 
investors and how satisfied are they with them? 
4 What are the challenges related to LP-GP relationships in private equity impact funds and how is 
profit sharing arranged? 
 
5 How do targets, modelling and measurement methods and GP compensation structures affect the 
financial and impact performance of an impact investing fund? 
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1.3 Research design, methodology and scope 
1.3.1 Research design and methodology 
The research consists of two parts: the theoretical and the empirical part. The theoretical part is a 
literature review on academic research about impact investing and private equity from a GP’s 
point of view. Because there is a limited amount of academic research conducted about impact 
investing, the review will also include findings from practitioner reports and surveys. The aim of 
the literature review is to get a good understanding and overview of the state of the impact 
investing industry especially in terms of its definition, the different modelling and measuring 
methods available as well as what kind of compensation structures are currently used. 
Additionally, the aim is to understand the special characteristics of private equity that might affect 
the execution of an impact strategy. All in all, the goal is to gain a good understanding of how an 
impact investing strategy could be implemented by a private equity fund manager and what are 
the challenges related to that. The findings and conclusions from this theoretical part are then used 
to form the research hypotheses.  
Secondly, an empirical study is conducted to test the hypotheses. A quantitative approach is used 
to analyse data from several sources: deal level data and portfolio company data from Preqin and 
Crunchbase databases and survey data gathered from European impact investors. The deal data 
from Preqin includes venture capital and buyout deals made by European investors since 1980 
and the portfolio company data from Crunchbase includes company specific information. The 
gathered survey data on the other hand consists of information on the fund manager targets, 
practices and overall approach to impact investing.  
These data sources are then combined on a fund manager level to link the survey answers to the 
attributes and performance metrics of the individual deals. A multiple linear regression analysis 
is completed on the resulting data set using statistical software Stata. The aim of the regression 
analysis is to answer the fifth research question, whereas the first four questions will be answered 
by the literature review and the survey data. 
1.3.2 Scope 
Most of the impact investing research made to date have not been limited to any single asset class. 
However, the structures, practices and stakeholders involved in different asset classes such as 
bonds, loans and equity are so varied that executing an impact investing strategy would be quite 
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different through each of them. To my knowledge, there aren’t any studies conducted specifically 
on impact investing in private equity. Therefore, the scope of this study is limited to private equity 
investors and their possibilities of executing an impact investing strategy.  
Furthermore, even though the boundaries between impact investing and related concepts such as 
responsible investing and ESG strategies are somewhat blurred, this study focuses strictly on GPs 
that manage at least one impact focused fund. An impact fund is defined here as one that is 
identified and labelled specifically as an impact investing fund instead of “sustainable”, “green” 
or anything of that sort.  
Finally, the geographical scope of the study is limited to Europe due to two reasons. Firstly, even 
though impact investing is booming in the US, the private equity industry there is quite different 
from its European counterpart in terms of size of the industry, its structures and practices. 
Secondly, the term impact investing is understood and used quite differently outside of the 
European context. In some regions it is common to use impact investing as a marketing word, 
without actually having any impact modelling or measurement practices in place. Therefore, in 
order to eliminate the effects of regional differences, only European investors are included. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Definition of impact investing 
In the past 12 years since the inception of the term impact investing in 2007, many academics and 
practitioners alike have made numerous attempts to define the term. Most definitions seem to be 
somewhat aligned, but still there remains some ambiguity as well as outright disagreement about 
the definition. 
In their visionary article, Bugg-Levine & Emerson (2011) state that impact investing is about 
pursuing financial returns while also intentionally having a positive social or environmental 
impact. They introduce the term blended value to refer to this double objective. Furthermore, they 
note that actively managing and measuring the impact is essential as well as the intentionality of 
the investor. As it can be argued that in fact all investments have some kind of an impact (whether 
it be positive or negative), it is important to distinguish impact investments as those that have 
been made intentionally to pursue a specific measurable and positive impact and where the non-
financial part is also managed. 
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Most attempts to define impact investing seem to be in line with this definition. Grabenwarter & 
Liechtenstein (2011) determine that impact investing consists of profit orientation, correlation 
between impact and financial returns, intentionality, measurability and a positive effect on 
society. Similarly, at JPMorgan Chase impact investing is seen as funding market-based 
approaches to solving social and environmental challenges that can simultaneously generate 
market rate returns (Bell, 2013). The most simple definitions settle for simply stating that impact 
investing is about targeting both financial returns and social or environmental impact (Clarkin & 
Cangioni, 2016; Combs, 2014; Hebb, 2013; O'Donohoe et al., 2010; Roundy, Holzhauer, & Dai, 
2017). 
Moreover, Höchstädter & Scheck (2014) conclude in their analysis of views from both 
practitioners and academics that there is actually less disagreement on the definition of impact 
investing than expected. In their sample most practitioners and academics share the views of 
Bugg-Levine & Emerson (2011) that impact investing targets both financial and non-financial 
returns. Importantly, they note that the level of financial returns does not need to be limited in any 
way. There seems to be an understanding that whether it be below, at or above market rates, the 
financial targets don’t matter as long as they exist alongside the impact targets. 
While this definition seems quite straightforward and easy to accept, many sceptics have voiced 
their concerns regarding the details of it. First of all, many questions have been raised about the 
viability of achieving non-financial impact without compromising the financial returns. Some 
claim that there is an inevitable trade-off between high impact and financial return and that 
expecting to achieve both is unrealistic (Cheng, 2011; Evans, 2013; Mitchell et al., 2008). Brest 
and Born (2013) on the other hand argue that it all comes down to the additionality the impact 
investor can provide: if there is an investment possibility that generates market rate returns while 
also making a positive impact, it would get funded anyway by the traditional investors seeking 
only returns and thus the impact investor wouldn’t achieve any additional impact value. However, 
they do admit that in new and emerging markets, “in imperfect markets”, the impact investor 
might see opportunities that traditionally thinking investors miss and therefore they are in a good 
position to promote and grow the market and thus generate a positive impact. 
Contrarily to these opposing views, Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein (2011) claim that 
environmental or social impact in fact correlates positively with financial profits. They state that 
in impact investing impact should be an inherent part of the business logic so that when the 
company is performing well, it generates both impact and profits. In other words, impact should 
not be thought of as an additional element of the business model that is independent of the 
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financial business logic. Thus, in the same way as in economies of scale the production costs are 
lower for each additional unit, each new “unit of impact” costs less than the previous and 
therefore, the more impact is generated, the more profits ensue (Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein, 
2011). 
In addition to profitability, another area of ambiguity is how impact investing relates to and differs 
from other similar concepts such as socially responsible investing (SRI), sustainable finance and 
the ESG (environmental, social and governance) principles. Some argue that impact investing is 
a sub-category of responsible investing while others claim that impact investing is a broader term 
for social investing and still some insist that impact investing is a synonym for implementing the 
ESG principles into mainstream investment processes (Hebb, 2013; Höchstädter & Scheck, 
2014). The terms are used as synonyms, as broader concepts and as sub-categories to one another.  
In their study of academics and practitioners Höchstädter & Scheck (2014) address this 
terminological ambiguity. They conclude that impact investing is considered to be something that 
goes beyond SRI, sustainable finance or ESG principles. These terms have traditionally been used 
to describe investment strategies where the negative risks related to environmental, social and 
governance factors are screened in the investment process and some ethical guidelines are 
followed in order to avoid certain types of investments (traditionally meaning alcohol, weapons, 
tobacco etc.) or to minimize the overall negative effects on a portfolio level. Impact investors 
don’t feel that these terms adequately represent the activities they are doing as they refer to 
avoiding harm and risks whereas impact investors target disruptive change and seek to find new 
solutions with positive impact on the society (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011).  
Moreover, impact investing differs from SRI in the size and nature of the investments 
(Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014). Impact investments are typically direct, often equity-based 
investments in early-stage companies, whereas responsible investing is typically executed 
through a wide portfolio of smaller investments into established companies that promote desirable 
corporate practices (Roundy et al., 2017).  
All in all, responsible investing, ESG investing and impact investing all consider similar aspects 
in the investment process, but the approach to those aspects varies in terms of the level of rigor 
in investment analysis as well as in expected outcomes. In Figure 2, these investment strategies 
are presented on a spectrum of transparency, measuring and reporting, commitment, impact and 
intentionality. 
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As can be seen, negative screening or exclusion of certain industries or companies is at the far 
left of the spectrum. That means that the levels of measuring and reporting, commitment, impact 
and intentionality are the lowest. Second on the spectrum, there is positive screening, which 
means focusing on the best performing companies or industries as measured by the ESG or 
corporate responsibility matters. The next step from that is complete ESG integration, where the 
ESG matters (both risks and opportunities) are integrated as an essential part of the investment 
analysis and decision-making processes. This level of sophistication already requires quite high 
transparency, measuring and reporting tools and commitment from the investor. 
 
Figure 2. Spectrum of responsible investing and impact investing (modified from FVCA, Sitra, 
& Deloitte, 2017) 
Finally, so-called thematic investments and impact investing are situated at the far right of the 
spectrum. They are distinguished mainly by the fact that unlike the other investing strategies they 
don’t revolve around assessing the internal processes and operations of the target companies but 
instead focus mostly on the external impact the companies have. Therefore, they are in a class of 
their own when it comes to the overall impact of the strategies. What differentiates impact 
investing from thematic investments are the notions of intentionality and proactivity in the 
investment activities. Whereas thematic investments are a simple way of focusing investments 
around a certain theme such as preventing global warming, impact investing takes a rigorous 
approach to setting measurable impact targets and intentionally striving towards them. 
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2.2 Impact modelling 
Most of the discussion around impact investing focuses around the question of measurement. 
Often modelling is overlooked even though it is at least as important, if not more, than measuring. 
Investors are realizing that modelling the desired impacts is an important part of their investment 
strategy and that in order to know which metrics to measure, the desired impact should be 
modelled first (Hehenberger & Harling, 2018). 
The Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra has done a lot of research on impact investing and they strongly 
highlight the importance of modelling before investing. According to them, there can be many 
ways to achieve certain impacts and all actions towards those impacts can have multiple effects 
on other areas (Heliskoski, Humala, Kopola, Tonteri, & Tykkyläinen, 2018; Männistö, 2016). 
Therefore, it is important to include specialists from different fields to the modelling process. 
Theory of change is one useful tool in mapping one’s impact targets. Jackson (2013) claims that 
a theory of change is actually a core component of the very definition of impact investing along 
with intent and impact itself. If an investment is intended to have a certain impact on the world, 
the dynamics of the situation need to be understood first (Jackson, 2013). What outputs are 
expected to ensue from the investment and how are they expected to generate the desired impact?  
Hehenberger and Harling (2018) also note that whereas earlier many impact investors tended to 
just define an area that they focus on, nowadays it has become increasingly common for the 
investors to have developed their own theory of change. A theory of change defines the specific 
impact targets that the investor aims to achieve and what actions are expected to lead to the desired 
outcomes.  
A helpful tool for creating a theory of change is the so called IOOI-chain i.e. the chain of inputs, 
outputs, outcomes and impact (see Figure 3) (Heliskoski et al., 2018). The general idea behind 
the chain is that inputs such as money, time and human resources are required in order to generate 
outputs (e.g. hours spent on education or number of products produced). The outputs can then 
lead to outcomes like children being educated or fossil fuels being replaced by solar energy. The 
outcomes are not yet impact but instead they enable the impact to happen; educated children have 
better chances of being employed, which improves their quality of life and replacing fossil fuels 
with solar panels reduces the CO2 emissions generated and thus prevents climate change and 
preserves nature and wildlife.  
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Figure 3. The IOOI chain (modified from (Männistö, 2016) 
Sitra also adds the measurement of impact value to the IOOI-chain. If the impacts are modelled 
precisely, deducting the savings and financial benefits that accrue from them is feasible. For 
example, Sitra has modelled the financial savings gained from investing in the prevention of social 
exclusion in comparison to only doing corrective work afterwards (Männistö, 2016). 
2.3 Impact measurement 
There is a growing need for impact measurement tools as impact investing is gaining more 
momentum and as responsibility and sustainability concerns in general are becoming more 
mainstream.  Investors want to know how their investments are performing on the social return 
scale compared to their financial returns, but traditional measurement analyses typically disregard 
social value creation and focus only on financial returns. This calls for methods that could 
quantify social returns similarly to how financial returns are quantified (Bengo, Arena, Azzone, 
& Calderini, 2016). 
Emerson (2003) notes that many people active in the social sector appeal to the seemingly 
believable claim that quantifying impact is impossible because “some things simply can’t be 
measured” and therefore disregard any attempt to do so. Many academics share the view that 
comparing different impacts in different target groups and environments is not possible (Kroeger 
& Weber, 2014). However, there are many ways to triangulate and estimate the worth of different 
things and actions even though it may not be easy (Emerson, 2003). 
Contrarily to financial profits that are mutually understood and straightforward to measure, 
measuring impact is a slightly more challenging issue. There are a myriad of different views and 
opinions on how impact should be defined and what measurements should be used. Already at 
the very beginning of the impact investment industry, there were a great deal of different 
measurement frameworks provided by different organizations and rating agencies (Olsen & 
Galimidi, 2008). However, in more recent years there has been some consolidation and the issue 
of diverging methods has been addressed (Barby, 2019). 
Input Output Outcome Impact
Impact 
value
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2.3.1 Impact Reporting and Investment Standards 
Despite the various opinions on measurement in the impact investing industry, there is also some 
common ground. The Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS), an initiative by GIIN, 
can be considered as somewhat of an industry standard as they are the most widely used as a base 
for impact measurement (Reisman & Olazabal, 2016). According to the Annual Impact Investor 
Survey, 49 % of respondents use metrics that are aligned with IRIS to measure their impact 
(Mudaliar et al., 2019).  
The IRIS consists of hundreds of generally accepted and publicly available standardized metrics 
to measure social, environmental and financial performance (Reisman & Olazabal, 2016). The 
idea is that each organization can choose the metrics that suit their goals (e.g. a clean energy 
company would choose some environmental metrics whereas an organization increasing girls’ 
education possibilities would choose among the list of social metrics).  
The clear benefits of IRIS are that they are so widely adopted among the industry. It is a 
commonly known and accepted catalogue of objective metrics that are easy to understand 
(Reisman, Olazabal, & Hoffman, 2018). It also offers flexibility as it provides such a wide range 
of metrics to choose from. Some however claim that there aren’t enough metrics in IRIS to 
represent the myriad of different social and environmental impacts (Kroeger & Weber, 2016). On 
the other hand, the huge number of metrics available can also be seen as the most significant 
challenge related to IRIS; it can be difficult to decide which indicators to use (Hehenberger & 
Harling, 2018). 
Furthermore, some see the bottom-up approach of the IRIS metrics as a possible issue saying that 
it might restrict the inclusion of top-down approaches that are more subjective and tailored to 
each case. Even though in some cases objectivity can be seen as a positive attribute, it can also be 
considered too restrictive and therefore not adjustable enough for all cases (Reeder & Colantonio, 
2013). 
2.3.2 Global Impact Investment Rating System 
As IRIS provides a great starting point for measuring impact, it is used as a basis for many rating 
and measurement systems. One of the most well-known ratings is the Global Impact Investment 
Rating System (GIIRS) provided by B Analytics. The rating is based on analysing three 
components in light of the IRIS metrics: an overall impact business model rating, an overall 
operations rating and a fund manager assessment. These components are then compared against 
given thresholds, to determine the relative performance of a fund (B Analytics, 2019). 
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GIIRS rating’s most prominent benefit is that it provides an objective and standardized third-party 
rating, that is comparable and transparent. It is analogous to the Morningstar investment analysis 
system, that is well-known and widely used for analysing and comparing traditional investments, 
which makes GIIRS easily approachable (Jackson, 2013).  It is best-suited for evaluating the 
impact of funds that make equity and debt investments (Clarkin & Cangioni, 2016). 
On the downside, GIIRS has some integrated weightings in the rating system that affect the 
maximum amount of points a certain company can obtain. These weightings cannot be changed 
by the user even though they might not be suitable for all cultures or value systems (Kroeger & 
Weber, 2016). 
2.3.3 Social Return on Investment  
Social return on investment (SROI) is, as its name indicates, a modification of the conventional 
return on investment (ROI) that compares the input, i.e. the money invested, to the output, i.e. the 
financial returns to measure the efficiency of an investment (Davis & Pett, 2002). Similarly, the 
SROI is calculated as the monetary value of the social returns gained compared to the amount of 
money invested (Polonsky & Grau, 2011).  
The monetization of the social value is estimated case by case based on the theory of change of a 
social enterprise (Kroeger & Weber, 2014). The process consists of three parts: 1) identifying the 
key stakeholders, 2) assessing the change in outcomes that can be attributed to the impact creator 
and 3) estimating the financial value of the outcomes (Reeder & Colantonio, 2013). 
The main benefit of this analysis is that it is focused on the theory of change of the enterprise and 
therefore offers case-specific understanding of the impacts. Additionally, as the value of the 
impacts is monetized it simplifies the metrics and makes it suitable for use even in financial 
analyses (Kroeger & Weber, 2016). 
However, these benefits also present the major challenges. As the SROI is customized based on 
the theory of change, the challenge is defining monetary values of social returns so that they are 
comparable between different types of social impacts. The more different the social aims and 
target groups are the more difficult it is to compare their monetary value. One way to overcome 
this monetization issue is to measure the subjective impact generated based on the stakeholders’ 
own opinions since comparing the amount of subjective improvements achieved is easier than 
defining exact values for the changes (Kroeger & Weber, 2014; Reeder & Colantonio, 2013). 
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While the subjective measurement case by case may be accurate, a clear downside of the SROI is 
that it is too arduous and time consuming to implement in full (Reeder & Colantonio, 2013). As 
a response to this critique some lighter methods for calculating SROI have been presented such 
as SROI Lite that only focuses on the single most important outcome that is targeted and the unit 
cost of achieving it (Olsen & Galimidi, 2008). However, this method clearly involves such heavy 
simplifications that it might defeat the whole purpose of such a rigorous approach. 
2.3.4 Sustainable Development Goals 
Another commonly used framework for measuring impact are the Social Development Goals 
(SDGs) introduced by the UN in their 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United 
Nations, 2015). The SDGs consist of 17 separate targets such as eliminating poverty and hunger 
and promoting equality and responsible consumption (see Figure 4). According to the impact 
investor survey, 62 % of respondents track some or all of their impact investments’ performance 
to the UN SDGs (Mudaliar et al., 2019). 
 
Figure 4. UN Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2015) 
The main benefits of the SDGs are that they bring concreteness to the issues of sustainability and 
inequality and therefore make it easier to envision solutions and business models to tackle them. 
Hehenberger and Harling (2018) recommend impact investors to use the SDGs more as they have 
been specifically designed to define the 17 most important areas where funding and actions are 
sorely needed. 
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Furthermore, Ruff and Olsen (2018) tout the SDG indicators for their flexibility as they allow for 
regional differences in the definitions to be considered. For example, poverty is defined trough 
national definitions instead of universal limits. However, not all of the indicators are as flexible. 
For example, youth is defined as people aged 15-24 years, which might be restricting in some 
countries if the concept of youth does not follow that exact definition. Therefore, some 
adjustments might be required to make the impacts aligned with the SDGs (Ruff & Olsen, 2018). 
2.3.5 Responsible investing metrics 
Other common sustainability and responsibility reporting and measuring frameworks include the 
Principles of Responsible Investing (PRI), Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and perhaps most 
prominently Environmental, Social and Governance principles (ESG) for which there are several 
specialized ratings agencies. All of these are intended for all investors to follow, not just impact 
investors and they have gained significant momentum in the past 10 years. For example, the 
number of signatories to the PRI and the assets managed under these signatories have increased 
over ten-fold since its launch in 2006 as can be seen in Figure 5 (UN PRI, 2017). 
 
Figure 5. AUM and number of signatories of the PRI (UN PRI, 2017) 
However, as they are aimed for all investors to use, they don’t necessarily measure the impact of 
a company, but rather whether their actions are sustainable and responsible. For example, a 
tobacco company might take good care of its employees and in that sense act responsibly but its 
overall impact on the world is still negative as it causes rainforest loggings and health hazards. 
Furthermore, the responsible investing metrics don’t measure any additionality that the investor 
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achieves, since responsible practices or actions towards sustainability are generally not caused by 
any specific investment but rather they are part of the normal development and improvement of 
the company.  
All in all, responsible investing metrics might serve as proxies for some specific impacts and they 
might be useful in some measurement challenges, but they do not fully represent the objective of 
impact measurement where the impact should be intentional and, in some way, attributable to the 
investment (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011). 
2.3.6 Upright Project 
A recent and quite ambitious initiative is the Upright Project. Founder and CEO of the Upright 
project Annu Nieminen states (personal communication, Feb 21, 2019) that their aim is to 
measure the net impact of companies using a neural network for natural language processing. 
Thus, the approach is, contrarily to other impact measurement methods, very top-down focused 
and science-based: their AI scans through a database of scientific articles and looks for mentions 
of specific products and impacts. Then the neural network categorizes the findings as either 
positively or negatively correlating. This process creates a mapping of all possible products, how 
they are linked to each other and what impacts does each product cause. 
The net impact of companies is then calculated as an aggregated measure of their products’ 
impacts on four dimensions: environment, health, society and knowledge. The approach is clearly 
very data heavy and would be impossible to implement by using human resources only. Therefore, 
the clear benefit of the Upright model is that it is based on a machine learning method and can be 
scaled to analyse virtually an unlimited amount of companies. Hence, it is good at providing a 
good idea of the big picture, i.e. the total net impact of a fund quickly and efficiently (Nieminen, 
A., personal communication, Feb 21, 2019). 
Moreover, one of the major differences of the Upright model compared to other impact 
measurement models is that it provides a net analysis instead of focusing on a few metrics chosen 
by an analyst or the company itself. It takes into account also the harm caused by producing 
something that is seemingly good and beneficial and compares their magnitude to achieve a net 
analysis. This is important because, while many energy companies for example might look bad 
on some traditional scales of environmental activity where only the GHG emissions produced are 
considered, the Upright model also considers the benefits they generate to the entire society by 
providing the necessary electricity to schools, hospitals and households (Nieminen, A., personal 
communication, Feb 21, 2019). 
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On the downside, the model isn’t very good at comparing companies that are in the same business. 
For example, if two companies that are of the same size and produce very similar products, they 
would most likely have the same net impact in the Upright model even though their operating 
model might be different (Nieminen, A., personal communication, Feb 21, 2019). 
Finally, an interesting feature of the model is that it forces the user to make choices about how 
should the model weigh different impact dimensions based on their personal values. The user can 
choose to value each dimension equally or they can choose for example to put more weight on 
environmental factors than knowledge creation (Nieminen, A., personal communication, Feb 21, 
2019). This can be seen both as a negative and a positive feature because on the other hand it 
provides the user with the opportunity to use their own values rather than imposing values decided 
by someone else, but on the other hand, it means that there is no universal solution and that the 
user has to decide which is more important – environment or knowledge, health or society? 
2.3.7 Impact Management Project 
Even though there are similarities and a lot of common ground between the different impact 
measurement systems and methods, having so many different approaches to measurement reduces 
the credibility of the industry and slows down its growth. In the impact investor survey 75 % of 
the respondents think that sophistication of impact measurement practices is a moderate or 
significant challenge to the growth of the impact investment industry (Mudaliar et al., 2019).  
The Impact Management Project (IMP) aims to tackle precisely this challenge. The project has 
brought together over 2000 practitioners in the impact investment industry globally to establish 
common norms for impact measurement. As a result, they suggest a framework based on five 
essential dimensions of impact: what, who, how much, contribution and risk. They imply that 
whichever measurement method is used, the impact analysis should contain these five dimensions 
in some form or another: what is the outcome, who experiences the outcome, how much of the 
outcome occurs, what is the investor’s contribution to the outcome and what is the risk that the 
outcome does not occur as expected (Barby, 2019) . 
This framework could be applied to any of the existing methods for impact measurement to ensure 
that the measurement is extensive. The additionality and risk factors are often omitted from many 
analyses as they are hard to estimate even though they are important elements of the achieved 
impact. However, the IMP framework does not include consideration for the net impact aspect 
that is promoted for example by the Upright Project. 
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2.3.8 Academic metrics 
Despite these efforts to unify and standardize metrics, many academics still have concerns that 
the lack of sophisticated evaluation methods is a severe threat to the development of the industry 
and call for emphasis on the evaluators’ role (Clarkin & Cangioni, 2016; Reisman et al., 2018). 
However, Ruff and Olsen (2018) note that there is a disparity between the investors’ and the 
evaluators’ objectives: investors want to simplify and standardize metrics as much as possible so 
that comparing and analysing investments is as easy as possible – evaluators on the other hand 
believe that uniform measures lack sufficient relevance because they are too generalized.  
Ruff and Olsen (2018) propose a three part solution to this dilemma: harnessing operational data, 
using constructs with bounded flexibility and engaging a cadre of impact analysts capable of 
interpreting impact reports. In essence their suggestion consists of gathering low-level operational 
data, setting loose standards on what data is relevant to which industries and then involving 
professional evaluators to do the analysis so that it is coherent and comparable. Hehenberger and 
Harling (2018) develop this viewpoint even further and suggest that with the help of evaluators 
impact investors could actually report an impact-adjusted return, similarly to the notion of risk-
adjusted return that is commonly used in finance.  
2.4 Impact in private equity 
While O’Donohoe et al. (2010) claim in their pioneering report that impact investing is a new and 
emerging asset class in itself, most academics and practitioners note that impact investing is a 
strategy that can be applied to many asset classes such as debt or equity (Höchstädter & Scheck, 
2014). O’Donohoe et al. (2010) also admit that impact investing can sometimes be executed 
through these traditional asset classes. In a report about impact investing by the World Economic 
Forum (World Economic Forum, 2013), it is explicitly stated that impact investing is not an asset 
class but rather an investment strategy.  
Setting the definitional debate aside, it is clear that impact investing can be implemented in private 
equity as an investment approach. In fact, according to the annual impact investor survey by the 
Global Impact Investor Network (GIIN) even though private debt has the greatest share of AUM 
allocated to it, private equity is the most commonly used instrument − 71 % of all respondents 
have allocated at least some of their AUM to private equity. Furthermore, in their survey for-
profit fund managers comprise 47 % of the sample and manage 30 % of the combined AUM 
(Mudaliar et al., 2018). Thus, private equity is clearly a relevant outlet for impact investing. 
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2.4.1 Private equity characteristics 
The global private equity (PE) market is huge, managing over $2.8 trillion of assets at the end of 
2017 (Preqin, 2018). The industry provides funding for entrepreneurs, startups, companies 
looking to expand their business, companies in financial distress, private middle-market 
companies as well as public companies looking for a buyout investment (Fenn, 1996). 
In general, the private equity industry is considered to consist of two types of investors: venture 
capital (VC) investors who make minority investments in scalable early stage companies that have 
very small or even no revenues and buyout investors who make majority investments in more 
mature companies that have the potential to grow and expand their business significantly. The 
typical holding period of an investment is only 3-7 years, which means that private equity 
investors aim to increase the value of their investment target companies in quite a short period of 
time and then cash-in the profits. 
The PE industry has been booming for decades, keeping in mind that in 1980 it had only $5 billion 
in assets under management (Fenn, 1996) compared to the current $2.8 trillion. The enormous 
growth of the industry has been largely enabled by the adoption of limited partnerships in the late 
1970s (Fenn, 1996). Limited partnerships are a vehicle for institutional investors – referred to as 
limited partners (LPs) – such as family-offices and financial institutions to invest into funds 
managed by investment professionals – referred to as general partners (GPs) – instead of having 
to manage the direct investments themselves (Fenn, 1996). 
This LP-GP structure has since become a ubiquitous feature of the private equity industry (Fenn, 
1996). GPs try to attract LPs to invest in their fund and then invest their funds in a profitable way 
in order to ensure future funding from them. The GPs also have to manage the possibly varied 
expectations of the different LPs and meet their requirements.   
The lifespan of a fund is typically 10 years, during which investments are made and committed 
capital is drawn from the LPs as needed (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). The fund’s lifespan ends 
when it is liquidated, and the returns to the LPs are realized only then. An essential question 
regarding this setting is of course how the fund manager compensation and the profit sharing 
among fund managers and investors are organized. 
Typically, the fund manager compensation consists of a management fee that is around 2 % and 
a carried interest that refers to a share of the net gains, which is generally 20 % (Litvak, 2009; 
Metrick & Yasuda, 2010; Robinson & Sensoy, 2013; Sahlman, 1990; Schmidt & Wahrenburg, 
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2003). Some compensation schemes include also a so-called hurdle rate, which is an interest rate 
that must be paid to the investor before the fund manager earns the carried interest (Metrick & 
Yasuda, 2010; Schmidt & Wahrenburg, 2003). GP remuneration policies are also regulated in the 
EU under the alternative investment fund managers directive (AIFMD) (ESMA final report: 
Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under the AIFMD.2013). 
Deciding on the compensation structure is crucial because as agency theory suggests, there might 
be conflicting interests of the fund managers (“agents”) and investors (“principals”) (Eisenhardt, 
1989). In order to align these interests, some restrictions to the compensation structures can be 
set. One common requirement is that the fund managers must invest in their own fund so that they 
have an ownership of at least 1 % (Robinson & Sensoy, 2013; Sahlman, 1990).  
In addition to certain structural traits, private equity investments are also strongly characterized 
by their exceptional risk and return profile. Especially venture capital (VC) investments that are 
made into early-stage companies have high risks but also extremely high returns: according to a 
study of venture investments in the US 30 % of direct investments fail completely, i.e. do not 
generate any returns, while about 10 % of the investments provide over 10x returns (Cochrane, 
2005; Weidig & Mathonet, 2004). However, investing into a VC fund is not nearly as volatile as 
direct investments since the fund provides diversification. The probability of a total loss in a VC 
fund is just 1 % but on the other hand, the portion of fund investments providing over 10x returns 
is also much smaller, just under 2 % (Cochrane, 2005; Weidig & Mathonet, 2004). 
Buyout investment that target more established companies are also risky, but the risk profile of 
buyout funds is more evenly distributed than that of VC funds. They have the same probability of 
total loss, 1 %, but the portion of extremely well performing investments having over 10x returns 
is much smaller, less than 0.5 %.  The losses are not as drastic as in VC funds, but neither are the 
returns: the average loss given a loss in a buyout fund is -23 % compared to -29 % in a VC fund 
but the risk-to-return ratio is 0.8 in a buyout fund and 0.4 in VC fund. All in all, buyout might be 
slightly less risky, but it also has lower returns compared to the risks.  (Weidig & Mathonet, 2004) 
2.4.2 Impact strategies in private equity 
The special characteristics of the PE industry set some challenges on how impact investing can 
be executed in private equity. The LP-GP structure means that decision-making and operative 
management are in different hands; GPs manage the funds and need to decide how they want to 
pursue impact, but LPs hold the power to decide whether they’ll invest into a fund. This means 
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that in addition to structuring their impact strategies the GPs must convince the LPs of those 
strategies in order for them to invest in their funds. 
Convincing a socially neutral LP who is only looking for market rate returns, to invest in an 
impact fund, can be challenging for the fund managers. As many doubts have been voiced 
regarding the viability of generating impact while achieving market rate returns (Cheng, 2011; 
Evans, 2013; Mitchell et al., 2008), the financially oriented LPs might not be willing to give 
impact investing a chance at first. Indeed, according to the impact investor survey, 67 % of the 
fund managers receive capital from family-offices or high net-worth individuals, who generally 
have also other than financial interests, whereas just 46 % receive capital from banks, who are 
likely to be financially focused (Mudaliar et al., 2019). However, an investment from a respected 
institution can help alleviate the doubts of the financially oriented investors (Brest & Born, 2013). 
On the other hand, there are an increasing number of signals indicating that investors have a 
growing demand for investment vehicles that “do good”. 51 % of the respondents in the Annual 
Impact Investor Survey say that client demand is a “very important” motivation for them to do 
impact investments (Mudaliar et al., 2019). Furthermore, impact focused GPs can also help 
socially neutral LPs realize that there are good impact investment possibilities that can provide 
returns while also having a positive impact (Brest & Born, 2013). 
However, having financial first and impact first LPs in the same fund could lead to conflicts of 
interest in an impact fund. If the LPs are motivated by different things and have different levels 
of expectations for returns, the GP might find it challenging to meet everyone’s requirements. 
The effects of different LPs’ motivations and varied LP demands in impact investing have not 
been studied much. 
Similar to private equity in general, impact investment opportunities are typically considered 
quite risky due to their disruptive nature and the fact that they often operate in completely new 
and emerging markets. 46 % of impact investment professionals agree that good impact investing 
targets are typically situated within high-risk markets (Mudaliar et al., 2018). However, 66 % also 
note that impact investment opportunities are perceived to be riskier because of the unfamiliar 
nature of new business models or untested markets (Mudaliar et al., 2018). Thus, while impact 
investments might be riskier than average, a lot of the perceived riskiness might actually stem 
from prejudices and concerns against the new and unknown. 
Furthermore, lack of appropriate capital across the risk/return spectrum is seen as the most 
significant challenge to the growth of the impact investing industry by practitioners who call out 
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for more early-stage, high-risk capital (Mudaliar et al., 2019). Thus, there is a clear need for risk-
taking private equity investors in the impact investing industry. 
Fund manager compensation in impact investing has not been studied much although it does raise 
some interesting questions. If the compensation is purely based on financial performance as in 
traditional private equity, aren’t the fund manager’s incentives misaligned with the impact 
targets?  
Typically, impact fund managers incentives are still tied only to the financial targets. However, 
with the emergence of more numerous and more sophisticated impact measurement methods 
some impact investors are adopting ways to incorporate impact performance into the 
compensation of their fund managers. While the exact implementations vary, most impact-based 
incentive structures seem to be organized around adjusting the carried interest percentage 
depending on whether the impact targets are achieved and to what extent (GIIN, 2011; Leytes & 
Abello, 2016). 
Another option to tie fund manager compensation to impact performance is an impact hurdle that 
refers to its financial counterpart in traditional private equity. Similar to a financial hurdle rate, 
an impact hurdle rate is paid to the investors before the fund manager gets the carried interest of 
the profits. However, unlike the financial hurdle, an impact hurdle is based on level of impact 
targets achieved. In other words, for the fund manager to receive carried interest, a predetermined 
level of impact must be achieved (Männistö, 2016). 
On the other hand, one could also argue that if the impact targets are truly aligned with the 
financial targets, and if impact and returns do in fact correlate as Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein 
(2011) claim, the financial incentives should be enough for the fund manager to achieve both 
impact and return. In that case compensation tied to impact results could lead to sub-optimizing 
and thus decrease financial and/or social/environmental returns. 
2.5 Hypotheses 
2.5.1 The effects of financial and impact targets on investment performance 
The very definition of impact investing states that impact investing is about targeting both 
financial returns and positive impacts, but it doesn’t specify the level of returns that should be 
targeted. Some impact investors might intentionally target below market rate returns because they 
want to focus on impact, whereas others may consider the financial returns equally important as 
the impacts and are not willing to compromise on their financial returns at all. It is logical to 
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assume that those investors, who set their financial targets high and are not willing to compromise 
on profits in exchange for impact, perform financially better than those that do the opposite.  
Moreover, in impact investments impact and financial returns correlate and support one another, 
because impact investors look for companies whose business models inherently combine impact 
and financial returns and thus as revenue increases, the amount of impact generated also increases 
(Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein, 2011). In other words, the more profits the company generates, 
the more it will also have generated positive impacts. Therefore, it can be expected that targeting 
higher return targets should also drive greater impact results. 
H1: Targeting higher returns improves the financial and impact performance of investments. 
Some impact investors focus solely on generating environmental or social impacts, while others 
target both. The performance of socially or environmentally focused impact investors has not 
been studied or compared previously. However, studies have shown that PE investors (both VC 
and buyout investors) who have a clear industry focus generally perform better than those that do 
not as they are able to gain specialist expertise (Cressy, Munari, & Malipiero, 2007; Gompers, 
Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2008). An investor with only environmental or social targets is 
likely to invest in selected industries whereas an investor targeting both doesn’t have a similar 
industry focus. Thus, using industry as an analogy to different types of impacts, it is likely that 
impact investors who focus on either social or environmental impact perform better than those 
that target both. 
H2: Targeting only environmental or social impacts instead of both improves the financial and 
impact performance of investments. 
Furthermore, the general assumption is that there are more high-impact, high-return possibilities 
within the environmental sector than the social one. Cleantech is often used as an example of a 
highly profitable industry that also generates major positive impacts as the positive impacts are 
so clearly aligned with financial interests e.g. through energy savings, emission reductions and 
more efficient use of natural resources. Social sector investments on the other hand are sometimes 
regarded more as philanthropy than investing since the link between social impact and high 
financial returns is not so clearly perceived. This view is also supported by the findings of Pandit 
and Tamhane (2018). Their study of 48 impact PE exits split by industry concluded that 
investments into cleantech and agriculture (environmental) were among the top performers while 
investments into education and healthcare (social) lagged behind. Therefore, it can be expected 
that environmentally focused investors perform better financially than the socially focused ones. 
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H3: Targeting environmental impacts improves the financial performance of investments. 
On the other hand, the positive impact in social impact investments is in some ways more tangible 
than in environmental impact investments. It is relatively easy to accept the value and positive 
impact that for example employing people at the bottom of the pyramid (BoP) or advancing 
people’s health generates, whereas environmental benefits are not so inherently obvious as there 
are varying studies and opinions about what is beneficial to the environment and what is not. 
Pandit and Tamhane (2018) also emphasize the social impact the investments in their study 
generated stating that they have affected the lives of 60 to 80 million people in India. Therefore, 
it is likely that socially focused investors perform better in terms of impact results than the 
environmentally focused ones. 
H4: Targeting social impacts improves the impact performance of investments. 
2.5.2 The effects of impact modelling and measuring on investment performance 
Studies have shown that good ESG performance and the use of ESG practices improve the 
operational performance of firms, which in turn increases firm valuation (Clark et al., 2015). 
Consequently, incorporating ESG analysis to investment processes and thus investing into 
companies that rank highly in ESG matters leads to higher overall ESG ranking of the portfolio 
which in turn has been shown to improve the financial performance of the portfolio (Clark et al., 
2015). So, in other words, using ESG tools in the investment process improves both the ESG 
performance and the financial performance of investments. 
The effects of modelling impacts before investing on the investment’s financial and impact 
performance has not been studied previously. However, using the results from ESG studies as 
analogous to impact investments, it can be assumed that incorporating impact modelling in the 
investment decision-making process is likely to improve the financial and impact performance of 
impact investments.  
H5: Modelling impact improves the investments’ financial and impact performance. 
Similarly as in impact modelling, the effects that using impact measurement methods after 
investing has on investment performance have not been studied previously. However, using ESG 
factors again as analogous to impact, studies have shown that reporting actively on ESG matters 
and setting clear ESG targets for portfolio companies, leads to improved ESG performance (Clark 
et al., 2015). Through active ownership and regular reporting, investors can drive better ESG 
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performance for the company which leads to better financial performance as well (Clark et al., 
2015). Therefore, it can be expected that using an impact investing strategy that involves 
measuring impact regularly after investing improves the investments’ financial and impact 
performance.  
H6: Measuring impact improves the investments’ financial and impact performance  
2.5.3 The effects of linking compensation to impact on investment performance 
It has not been studied in previous research whether tying impact performance to fund manager 
compensation is likely to improve the fund’s performance either financially or impact-wise. It 
could be argued either way. The opinion that linking compensation to impact would not improve 
performance is based on the logic that as impact investments are made into companies that have 
impact ingrained to their business model, the impact targets should naturally ensue from the 
financial returns (Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein, 2011). Therefore, sub optimizing separately for 
impact targets might lead to ineffectiveness in both financial terms and impact-wise. 
On the other hand, in corporate venture capital (CVC) studies it has been shown that 
compensation and incentive schemes do affect investment practices; CVC investors target earlier 
stage investments and higher syndication, i.e. higher return opportunities when awarded a 
performance-based pay (Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010).  
CVC investments can be used as an analogy to impact investments as the CVCs also have two 
separate objectives: financial returns and strategic fit of investment targets. CVCs aim to find the 
most potential ventures with the additional criteria that they fit their company’s strategy. Similarly 
impact investors aim to find the most potential ventures with the additional criteria that they 
generate a positive impact. Thus, using Dushnitsky and Shapira’s (2010) findings as analogous 
to impact investing, it can be expected that when rewarded based on the achieved impacts, the 
fund manager aims for more impact.  
Furthermore, it has been shown that performance-based pay affects not only investment decisions 
and practices but the actual performance as well: those CVCs that are compensated based on 
performance, achieve higher returns than those that are not (Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010). 
Therefore, it can be expected that the same applies also to impact investors and linking 
compensation to impact targets leads to improved impact performance. 
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When it comes to the effects that linking compensation to impact targets has on financial 
performance, following Grabenwarter and Liechtenstein’s (2011)  view on economies of scale in 
impact companies, the more impact that is generated the more profitable it is. Thus, incentivizing 
fund managers by impact-based pay, is expected to improve the investments’ financial 
performance as well. 
H7: Tying fund manager compensation to impact targets improves the investments’ financial and 
impact performance. 
2.5.4 Summary of hypotheses 
Hypotheses that are to be examined in this study are mainly formed based on the findings of the 
literature review. However, as the performance of impact investments has been studied only to 
very limited extent, some hypotheses also rely on findings on related or similar phenomena. These 
hypotheses aim to provide answers to the fifth research question of this study, i.e. to determine 
how the pre-set targets, modelling methods used, measuring methods used and linking 
compensation to impact affect the financial and impact performance of private equity impact 
investments. All of the hypotheses of this study are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Hypotheses 
No. Hypothesis 
H1 Targeting higher returns improves the financial and impact performance of investments. 
H2 Targeting only environmental or social impacts instead of both improves the financial and impact 
performance of investments. 
H3 Targeting environmental impacts improves the financial performance of investments. 
H4 Targeting social impacts improves the impact performance of investments. 
H5 Modelling impact improves the investments’ financial and impact performance. 
H6 Measuring impact improves the investments’ financial and impact performance. 
H7 Tying fund manager compensation to impact targets improves the investments’ financial and 
impact performance. 
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3 Data and methods 
3.1 Data 
The data used in this study comprises of two parts: survey data gathered from European impact 
fund managers and portfolio company data of the survey respondents, which is collected from 
Preqin and Crunchbase databases. These data are combined and then used to answer the research 
questions and test the hypotheses.  
The sample of the survey consists of 160 PE firms with impact focused funds, who are located in 
Europe. These firms have been found from several different sources. Firstly, from all the members 
of the GIIN, those who were labelled as asset managers and are based in Europe were selected to 
the sample. Secondly, from the Preqin database, a keyword search with “impact” among European 
fund managers resulted in a list of fund managers that mention impact on their website or 
elsewhere. Thirdly, the Toniic directory for impact investors was checked and a few additional 
fund managers were identified from their list. Finally, personal contacts and general knowledge 
of the industry was used to find a few more impact investors in Europe that were not listed in any 
of the previously mentioned sources. As GIIN membership is open to all investors interested in 
impact investing and the keyword search from Preqin wasn’t very restricting, the original 
resulting list of fund managers included some fund managers that don’t actually identify 
themselves as impact investors or don’t have any impact focused funds yet. Some fund managers 
also use the term “impact” to refer to financial or other impacts that don’t align with the definition 
of impact investing that is used in this study. Therefore, all of the fund managers in the list were 
individually checked to ensure that they are indeed impact investors and manage at least one 
impact fund. Those that didn’t meet these requirements were excluded from the list.  
This procedure resulted in the final sample of 160 European PE firms with impact funds. About 
33 % of them are based in the UK while Netherlands has the second highest representation with 
18 % of the total. France (12 %), Switzerland (11 %) and Germany (7 %) also have several impact 
focused PE investors among the total population. The rest are scattered across the Nordics and 
Western Europe. Out of the total population 33 % are general PE investors that engage in VC, 
growth and buyout investments. Similarly, 43 % identify as VC investors whereas just 19 % are 
buyout investors. About half of the VC and the buyout investors also report doing growth 
investments in addition to the 6 % who identify as purely growth investors. 
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All 160 PE firms were sent a detailed survey containing fund specific questions about the fund’s 
focus, impact and financial targets, modelling and measuring methods used, compensation 
structure as well as some questions about the fund managers’ opinions on the definition of impact 
investing, the LP-GP relationship in impact funds and the future of impact investing. Two 
reminders were sent to all of the firms and some individual reminders were also sent with the help 
of personal contacts. 
 Out of the total sample, 26 persons from 22 private equity firms responded to the survey, which 
corresponds to a 14 % firm level answer rate. In terms of the countries the firms are based in, the 
sample is very representative of the total sample population: 32 % of the respondents are UK-
based and 23 % are from the Netherlands. However, Germany, Denmark, Norway and Spain are 
all slightly overrepresented each with 9 % of the total, while France and Switzerland both 
represent only 5 % of the total sample. Regarding their investment focuses, general PE investors 
form just 18 % of the sample, while VC focused investors are the clear majority at 68 %. Buyout 
investors are just 9 % of the sample and those that focus solely on growth investments are 5 % of 
the total. Additionally, clearly over half of the VC and buyout investors also report making growth 
investments. Thus, it is clear that VC and growth investors are quite strongly overrepresented 
among the respondents compared to the total sample population. 
Some of the 22 survey respondents focus solely on impact investing and might have several funds 
dedicated to impact whereas others have a myriad of different funds out of which only one is 
dedicated to impact investments. Therefore, there are several responses for some firms as each 
impact fund manager answered the survey separately for their fund. On the other hand, some fund 
managers answered on behalf of several funds stating that they have the same practices in place 
in all of their firm’s impact funds. In total, these 22 firms have invested in 415 portfolio companies 
through their impact focused funds. The company and deal specific information for these 
companies is collected from Preqin and Crunchbase. 
Preqin is the largest global database for the alternative investments industry including private 
equity and debt, real estate, hedge funds, infrastructure and secondaries. It includes information 
about fund managers, deals and performance and it is used by industry professionals, researchers 
and the press. The data is sourced directly from the asset managers themselves. 
The deal data from Preqin includes most of the deals executed by European private equity 
investors since 1980. They are divided into venture capital deals and buyout deals. In total, there 
are 58 438 VC deals out of which 988 are made by the 160 impact investors identified in this 
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study, and 31 324 buyout deals out of which 482 are made by the impact investors. The majority 
of the impact investments made by the 22 survey respondents are included in Preqin data, but not 
all. Some investors are excluded from Preqin altogether and therefore Crunchbase data is used to 
fill in the missing information.  
Crunchbase is a data platform that gathers information about private and public companies 
globally. For each company they report, among other things, their founders, founding year, 
headquarters, employee count and all investments and funding the company has received. Ergo, 
they have more detailed information about the portfolio companies than Preqin that only tracks 
investment activity. 
Thus, combining data from Preqin and Crunchbase, the final data set including 415 impact 
investor and portfolio company pairs is formed. The information collected of each company 
includes company name, country, industry, first year of investment by the impact investor and the 
total amount of funding rounds they have had. Each company is also linked to the answers that 
their impact investor has given in the survey regarding the targets set and the modelling and 
measuring methods used to execute that investment among other things. 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Financial performance 
Impact investing was coined only in 2007 and started gaining momentum a few years after that, 
which means that the clear majority of impact funds are less than 10 years old. That in turn means 
that they haven’t reported any final results yet as the lifespan of a fund is typically at least 10 
years. Some interim results exist for the oldest funds, but as they are not available for the majority 
of funds and since interim results are not very meaningful in private equity funds because of the 
J curve effect (Weidig, Kemmerer, & Born, 2005), it is not feasible to use them in this study. This 
makes studying the financial performance of the investments challenging, as the widely used 
metrics of performance such as net IRR and average multiple are not available. 
Due to this lack of reported financials, a binary variable representing the existence of a second 
funding round is used in this study to indicate the financial success of an investment. It has been 
used similarly in previous studies to measure the financial performance of a VC investment using 
a logistic regression model (Ter Wal, Alexy, Block, & Sandner, 2016). The logic in using the 
occurrence of a second funding round as an indicator of financial performance is that if a company 
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receives later funding rounds from other investors, it means that it has most likely been successful 
and therefore the initial investment is likely to generate good returns. Some of the portfolio 
companies in the sample of this study have received many additional funding rounds, up to 17, 
but for the purposes of achieving more comparative results for the older and the more recent 
investments, they are coded into a binary variable that only indicates whether there has been an 
additional funding round or not. 
However, this indicator works only for VC investments and therefore buyout investments are 
excluded from this analysis. Also, in using the existence of a second funding round as an indicator 
of financial success, it is important to note that it doesn’t apply very well to recent investments as 
companies are not likely to need additional funding so soon. Hence, there might be a bias towards 
older investments being more successful. In order to overcome this issue, investments made in 
2018 and 2019 are excluded from the regression model, when analyzing financial performance. 
Impact performance 
As there are not any specific impact metrics included in the Preqin or Crunchbase databases, the 
impact performance has to be estimated by other available variables. In this study the Upright 
model is used to define the net impact of all the portfolio companies. The Upright method is 
chosen instead of the other measuring methods presented in chapter 2, because it is the only one 
that enables a quick and comparable analysis of the portfolio companies. The Upright model is 
readily available for anyone to study online and the impacts of different activities can be searched 
directly from their database.  
For the purposes of this study, each portfolio company is linked to the impact value that 
corresponds best to their core activities. For example, according to the Upright model, computer 
programming lessons and courses have a net impact value of 75.30 and thus, all the portfolio 
companies that offer programming lessons to consumers as their main business activity are given 
this impact value. Similarly, wholesale of fruits has a net impact values of 8.60 in the Upright 
database and so all the companies whose business focuses on selling fruits to businesses and 
retailers are given this net impact value. 
Normally in the Upright model, the net impact of each company is scaled with its revenue to 
account for the size of the company in estimating its net impact: larger companies naturally have 
larger impacts than smaller companies operating in the same industry. However, the revenue 
information is not available for the clear majority of the 415 portfolio companies in the sample of 
this study since it mostly comprises of very early stage companies whose revenues are not 
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reported in any databases and therefore revenue can’t be used to scale the impacts. On the other 
hand, precisely because most of the companies are very early stage, their revenues are likely to 
be in the same ballpark and therefore, scaling the net impact values with revenues, would not 
create huge differences between the companies. 
The Upright model also allows for weighting the four aspects considered in the model 
(environment, health, society and knowledge) differently based on personal preferences and 
values, but for the purposes of this study all of them are given equal weights and the net impact 
is defined as the combined values of these factors for each portfolio company. This resulting net 
impact value for each portfolio company is used as the net impact variable of the regression 
analyses. 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
Impact targets  
The impact targets of the GP are used in this study to examine the effect they have on the 
investments’ actual financial and impact performance, e.g. whether pursuing environmental 
targets leads to higher returns or impact results than pursuing social targets or vice versa. The 
survey allowed GPs to choose one of three options as their impact target: social, environmental 
or both. Thus, the impact targets are measured with n-1 binary variables: social targets (1=yes, 
0=no) and environmental targets (1=yes, 0=no). Having both social and environmental targets is 
used as the base category. 
Financial targets 
The financial targets of the GP are also used in this study to determine whether they affect the 
financial performance or the impact results of the investments. The general targets are measured 
with a categorical variable including three possible target return levels: 1) below market rate, 2) 
at market rate and 3) above market rate. The higher the value, the higher the financial targets of 
the investor. 
Financial compromise 
The willingness to compromise on profits for the sake of maximizing impact is used as an 
independent variable to study the effects it has on the financial and impact results of the 
investments. It is also measured on a three-step scale: 1) yes, in all investments, 2) yes, in some 
investments and 3) no. The higher the value, the stricter the financial targets of the investor. 
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Modelling methods 
Whether or not a GP uses some impact modelling methods is studied to analyze the effects it has 
on the financial and impact results. Modelling is defined as the pre-investment analysis of the 
impacts that are expected to occur from an investment. The use of modelling methods is measured 
on a scale of 1 to 3: 1) not used at all, 2) used in some investment decisions or 3) used in all 
investment decisions. Thus, the higher the value, the more the modelling methods are used. 
Additionally, for the subset of GPs that do use some modelling methods before investing, the 
effects of specific methods are studied as well. Three binary variables measure whether the 
investor uses theory or change, some other commonly available method or a modelling method 
developed by themselves (1=yes, 0=no). These variables are used in additional regression models 
analyzing only the subset of investors in question. 
Measuring methods 
The use of some kind of formal impact measuring methods is studied to see whether it affects the 
impact and financial performance of investments. Impact measuring is defined as measuring that 
takes place after the investment has been made. In this study the use of measuring methods is 
depicted on a scale of 1 to 3: 1) not used at all, 2) used in some investment decisions or 3) used 
in all investment decisions. Thus, the higher the value, the more rigorously the investments are 
measured after investing. 
In case the GP does measure the impact after investing, there are various different impact 
measuring methods that could be used. In this study, for the subset of GPs that use some 
measuring methods, all the different methods are represented with separate binary variables that 
determine whether or not that specific method is used or not (1=yes, 0=no). These variables are 
used in additional regression models analyzing only the subset of investors who reported using at 
least some measurement methods after investing. 
Third-party measuring methods 
The use of third-party measuring methods is also studied in order to see whether or not it affects 
the financial or impact results of an investment. The use of third-party measuring is represented 
with a categorical variable on a scale of 1 to 3: 1) not used at all, 2) used in some investment 
decisions or 3) used in all investment decisions. Thus, the higher the value, the more the investor 
relies on third-party impact evaluators in their impact measuring efforts. 
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Compensation structure 
The effects that linking fund manager compensation to achieved impact targets has on the impact 
and financial performance of investments is also examined in this study. The link of compensation 
to impact is measured with a simple binary variable that measures whether the GP’s compensation 
depends on impact in some way or not (1=yes, 0=no). 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Investment region 
The geographical location of the portfolio companies is likely to affect especially the financial 
performance of the investments as some regions are more volatile while some are growing faster 
than others. For example, Europe is a relatively stable and low risk region, whereas Asia has had 
a very fast-growing economy. These differences naturally effect the financial circumstances in 
which the portfolio companies operate and can have major effects on their performance. 
Therefore, portfolio company region is used as a control variable in this study. The regions of the 
investments are classified into either Europe, Americas, Asia or Africa and they are measured 
with n-1 binary dummy variables. Europe is used as the base category. 
Investment industry 
The industry in which the portfolio company operates is likely to affect the performance of the 
investment since different industries have different growth expectations at different times. For 
example, the dot com bubble accelerated the growth of internet companies at the turn of the 
century whereas the paper industry has seen a steep decline due to the digital revolution. So, the 
portfolio company industry is likely to affect the performance of investments and therefore it is 
used as a control variable in this study. The investments are classified into 9 different industries 
based on Preqin’s industry classification:  Consumer Discretionary & Business services, IT, 
Marketing & Telecoms, Industrials & Transportation, Energy & Utilities, Food & Agriculture, 
Healthcare, Education and Real Estate. The industries are measured with n-1 binary dummy 
variables. Consumer Discretionary & Business Services is used as the base category. 
Investment year 
The year when the investment has been made is also used as a control variable in this study. The 
economic situation of a given year naturally affects all investments made then; investments made 
during an economic downturn perform systematically worse than those made during an upturn. 
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Moreover, investments made long ago are more likely to have raised additional funding than more 
recent investments. Therefore, the year has to be accounted for in order to compare the 
performance of investments made in different years. Investment year is grouped into four five-
year periods (2000-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014 and 2015-2019) and measured with n-2 binary 
dummy variables. The first two year ranges contain very few investments and therefore they are 
both used as the reference category. 
Investment stage 
Investments made into companies in different stages of development have different success 
expectations. As mentioned in previously, VC investments are riskier than buyout investments 
(Weidig & Mathonet, 2004). Therefore, the stage of the investments as specified in Preqin or 
Crunchbase is also used as a control variable in this study. The four different stages (VC, growth, 
buyout, unspecified) are represented with n-1 binary dummy variables with “unspecified” used 
as the base category. 
3.2.4 Summary of variables 
There are two dependent variables that measure investments’ financial and impact performance 
and 8 independent variables that measure the targets set and methods used by the fund. 
Additionally, 9 independent variables measuring the use of specific impact modelling and 
measuring methods are used in additional regression models. Several control variables are also 
used in all of the regression models to account for such variation in the funds’ performance which 
is not caused by the independent variables. All of the variables are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Variables of regression analysis 
Variable Variable type Metric Value range 
Second-round Dependent variable Binary  
Net impact Dependent variable Continuous -50.07 – 193.44 
Environmental targets Independent variable Binary  
Social targets 
 
Independent variable Binary  
Financial targets Independent variable Categorical 1=below, 2=at, 3=above 
Financial compromise Independent variable Categorical 1=yes, 2=sometimes, 3=no 
Modelling Independent variable Categorical 1=no, 2=sometimes, 3=yes 
Modelling: Theory of change Independent variable Binary  
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Modelling: Other common Independent variable Binary  
Modelling: Own methods Independent variable Binary  
Measuring Independent variable Categorical 1=no, 2=sometimes, 3=yes 
Measuring: IRIS Independent variable Binary  
Measuring: GRI Independent variable Binary  
Measuring: IMP Independent variable Binary  
Measuring: SDG Independent variable Binary  
Measuring: Own methods Independent variable Binary  
Measuring: Qualitative Independent variable Binary  
Third-party measuring Independent variable Categorical 1=no, 2=sometimes, 3=yes 
Compensation Independent variable Binary  
Investment region Control variable Categorical 4 regions 
Investment industry Control variable Categorical 9 industries 
Investment year Control variable Categorical 4 five-year periods 2000-2019 
Investment stage Control variable Categorical VC, growth, buyout, unknown 
 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Multiple linear regression 
In this study, a multiple linear regression analysis is performed in order to study how the GP’s 
targets, modelling methods, measuring methods and compensation structure affect the financial 
and impact performance of investments. Linear regression is a predictive analysis method that is 
used to study how one or more independent variables affect the selected dependent variable. 
Multiple linear regression refers to a linear regression that includes more than one independent 
variable. The mathematical form of a multiple linear regression model is presented in equation 
(1) (Myers, 1990). 
𝑌𝑖′ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛 + 𝜀, where (1) 
𝑌𝑖′ = prediction of dependent variable  
𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑛 = independent variables  
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𝛽0 = constant term  
𝛽1 … 𝛽𝑛 = regression coefficients  
𝜀 = error term  
Using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, the parameters of the independent variables are 
estimated so that the sum of the squared deviations between the predicted values 𝑌𝑖′ and the actual 
values 𝑌𝑖  (see equation (2)) is minimized. 
∑(𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖
′)2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(2) 
The multiple linear regression analysis model includes five major assumptions: 1) weak 
exogeneity, 2) linearity, 3) constant variance (a.k.a homoscedasticity), 4) independence of errors 
and 5) lack of perfect multicollinearity (Myers, 1990). Firstly, weak exogeneity means that the 
independent variables can be assumed as fixed values rather than random variables. This entails 
that the independent variables are error-free, which is often not a fully realistic assumption, but it 
leads to sufficiently accurate estimates. Secondly, the requirement of linearity implies that the 
mean of the dependent variable is a linear combination of the regression coefficients. This, 
however, does not restrict the independent variables in any way – only their coefficients. Thirdly, 
homoscedasticity means that different values of the dependent variables have the same variance 
in their errors. This assumption does not apply if the scale of the variables is very large since 
variance generally depends on the predicted values as is the case in this study. Fourthly, the errors 
of the dependent variables must not correlate, i.e. they must be independent of each other. It is 
important to note, that this assumption does not require independence of the dependent variables 
– only their errors. Finally, the lack of perfect multicollinearity assumes that there are no 
independent variables that correlate perfectly with each other. This kind of a situation could ensue 
for example from having two independent variables that measure the same thing. 
3.3.2 Clustered robust standard errors 
The sample of this study does not conform to all of the built-in assumptions of the ordinary least 
squares method: the data points of the sample are not independent of each other nor identically 
distributed, because each GP in the survey has several portfolio companies and the GP’s answers 
linked to the companies are the same for all of their portfolio companies.  
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In order to account for this heteroscedasticity in the sample a robust standard errors method is 
used in this study in examining the effect the variables have on net impact. The robust standard 
errors method otherwise follows the regular OLS method with the exception of calculating the 
covariance matrix of the regression coefficient matrix (see equation (3)) (Rousseeuw & Leroy, 
1987). This is done to prevent the standard errors from being biased and inconsistent. 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐵) = (𝑋𝑇𝑋)−1𝑋𝑇𝑆𝑋(𝑋𝑇𝑋)−1    (3) 
 
Another method for countering the side effects of using OLS on a heteroscedastic data is 
clustering. As in this case the portfolio companies of different GPs form subgroups within the 
sample, clustering can help to compensate the biases. In addition to the robust standard errors, 
clustering is also used in the regression model that analyses the effects on net impact so that the 
data points of the sample are clustered by their respective GP. 
3.3.3 Logistic regression 
As the measure for the existence of a second funding round is a binary variable derived from the 
number of funding rounds, a logistic regression analysis is performed to examine its relationship 
to the independent variables. A logistic regression model is often used instead of a linear 
regression analysis when the dependent variable to be studied is discrete or binary because the 
linear regression model assumes that the prediction of the dependent variable can take any values 
and therefore it does not fit the nature of a binary dependent variable (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 
2008). The mathematical form of the logistic regression model is presented in equation (3).  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋(𝑥)) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛 (3) 
⟺ 𝜋(𝑥) =
𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1+⋯+𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛
1+𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1+⋯+𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛
, where 
 
𝜋(𝑥) = prediction of dependent variable  
𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑛 = independent variables  
𝛽0 = constant term  
𝛽1 … 𝛽𝑛 = regression coefficients  
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3.3.4 Winsorization 
In order to account for outlier values in the data, winsorization is performed on selected variables. 
Winsorization is a method for limiting the extreme values of a variable so that for example the 
smallest 5 % and the largest 5 % of the values are scaled down or up to the nearest limit. In this 
study as all of the independent and control variables are either binary or categorical variables, 
winsorization is only applicable to the net impact variable, and a 1 % and 99 % winsorization is 
performed on it. 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
All of the descriptive statistics of the variables of this study are presented in Table 4. The net 
impact values are presented as they were before winsorizing and the absolute numbers of funding 
rounds is presented instead of the binary second-round variable. 
The average net impact score of the analyzed portfolio companies is 22.94, with a standard 
deviation of 35.76. Thus, the average impact of the portfolio companies is clearly net positive. In 
the Upright database, the average net impact of all possible activities is 3.67, which is significantly 
lower than the average of the sample of this study. This means that at least in this sample, impact 
investors do seem to achieve a higher than average net impact in their portfolio companies.  
The lowest net impact value in the sample is -50.07 (selling unpackaged chicken meat) while the 
highest is 193.44 (offering microloans to impoverished borrowers). In comparison, in the Upright 
database, the absolute lowest value is -153 (weapons and ammunition) and the highest is 193.44 
(microloans). Thus, the sample is skewed towards the higher end of the possible net impact values. 
The mean of the funding rounds is 2.57 with a standard deviation of 2.55. This is typical for count 
data. Even though there are some companies that have had a very high number of funding rounds 
(up to 17), the mode of the number of funding rounds is 1. This is due to most of the investments 
being fairly recent: the average investment year is 2014. Therefore, it is reasonable that most of 
the companies have not received additional funding yet. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
1. Net impact 22.939 35.756 -50.070 193.440 415 
2. Funding rounds 2.588 2.617 1.000 17.000 415 
3. Target: Social 0.289 0.454 0.000 1.000 415 
4. Target: Environmental 0.149 0.357 0.000 1.000 415 
5. Financial target 1.988 0.474 1.000 3.000 415 
6. Financial compromise 2.692 0.544 1.000 3.000 415 
7. Modelling 2.617 0.565 1.000 3.000 415 
8. Modelling: Theory of change 0.733 0.443 0.000 1.000 415 
9. Modelling: Other common methods 0.120 0.326 0.000 1.000 415 
10. Modelling: Own methods 0.306 0.461 0.000 1.000 415 
11. Measuring 2.930 0.351 1.000 3.000 415 
12. Measuring: IRIS 0.308 0.462 0.000 1.000 415 
13. Measuring: GRI 0.031 0.174 0.000 1.000 415 
14. Measuring: SDG 0.388 0.488 0.000 1.000 415 
15. Measuring: IMP 0.480 0.500 0.000 1.000 415 
16. Measuring: Own methods 0.839 0.368 0.000 1.000 415 
17. Measuring: Qualitative methods 0.682 0.466 0.000 1.000 415 
18. Third-party measuring 1.212 0.438 1.000 3.000 415 
19. Compensation 0.573 0.495 0.000 1.000 415 
20. Region: Africa 0.101 0.302 0.000 1.000 415 
21. Region: Americas 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000 415 
22. Region: Asia 0.089 0.285 0.000 1.000 415 
23. Region: Europe 0.749 0.434 0.000 1.000 415 
24. Industry: Consumer Disc. & Business Services 0.176 0.381 0.000 1.000 415 
25. Industry: IT 0.214 0.411 0.000 1.000 415 
26. Industry: Marketing & Telecoms 0.029 0.168 0.000 1.000 415 
27. Industry: Industrials & Transportation 0.053 0.224 0.000 1.000 415 
28. Industry: Energy & Utilities 0.116 0.320 0.000 1.000 415 
29. Industry: Food & Agriculture 0.147 0.355 0.000 1.000 415 
30. Industry: Healthcare 0.140 0.347 0.000 1.000 415 
31. Industry: Education 0.101 0.302 0.000 1.000 415 
32. Industry: Real Estate 0.024 0.154 0.000 1.000 415 
33. Years: 2000-2004 0.024 0.154 0.000 1.000 415 
34. Years: 2005-2009 0.075 0.263 0.000 1.000 415 
35. Years: 2010-2014 0.330 0.471 0.000 1.000 415 
36. Years: 2015-2019 0.571 0.496 0.000 1.000 415 
37. Deal stage: Unspecified 0.311 0.463 0.000 1.000 415 
38. Deal stage: VC 0.593 0.492 0.000 1.000 415 
39. Deal stage: Growth 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000 415 
40. Deal stage: Buyout 0.036 0.187 0.000 1.000 415 
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Table 5. Pearson correlation table 
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The Pearson correlations of the variables is presented in Table 5. There are clearly quite a lot of 
significant correlations between the variables, which are caused by the nature of the binary 
variables. For example, all of the different modelling methods correlate positively with the use of 
modelling methods in general and the different measuring methods correlate positively with the 
use of measuring methods in general – if the GP uses a specific method (i.e. the value for that 
variable is 1) they must also have answered yes to the question of whether or not they use any 
modelling/measuring methods (i.e. the value of that variable is also 1). So, there are inevitably a 
lot of correlations among the independent variables and therefore the specific modelling and 
measuring methods are studied in separate regression models. 
4.1.2 Sample characteristics 
4.1.2.1 Survey sample characteristics 
In terms of the investment stage focus of survey respondents, the sample is very concentrated on 
venture and especially growth investments with 19 out of 26 mentioning growth as one of their 
focus areas. The survey allowed for choosing more than one focus area. Buyout or mezzanine 
investments were reported as an investment focus by only two respondents. Some reported that 
they invest also in real estate, energy assets and financial institutions which are out of the scope 
of this study and were thus excluded. The full distribution can be seen in Figure 6, which clearly 
shows the overemphasis on VC and growth investors as compared to the total sample population 
as discussed in section 3.1. 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of investment stage focuses by survey respondents 
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Similarly, in the regional focuses mentioned by the survey respondents, there is a clear emphasis 
on Europe as can be seen in Figure 7. It is understandable that Europe is the most popular region 
to invest in, since the scope of this study is limited to European impact investors. However, there 
is also a significant share of respondents who report Africa or Asia as their target region. This is 
likely to be a special characteristic of the impact investors since especially Africa is typically not 
favored by private equity investors as a target region. South and North America are targeted by a 
few respondents, while Australia is not targeted by anyone. It was possible to choose several 
regions as target areas. 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of investment region focuses by survey respondents 
The survey respondents were also asked about their views on the definition of impact investing. 
Everyone agreed with the statement that simply put, impact investing is about targeting both 
financial returns and impact. They were also fairly unanimous about financial returns and impact 
results being equally important and that there is a requirement of net positivity in impact investing. 
However, regarding measuring and intentionality, the opinions varied a bit more: 16 % disagreed 
on measuring and 12 % disagreed on intentionality being a requirement for impact investing. Still, 
most of the respondents agreed with those statements as well. The full distribution of the opinions 
can be seen in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. Survey respondents' view on the definition of impact investing 
Regarding the impact targets of the GPs, there is a clear emphasis on targeting both environmental 
and social targets: half of all respondents report to be targeting both kinds of impacts. Among 
those that focus only on one kind of impact targets, social impacts were somewhat favored: 35 % 
of all the respondents focus solely on social targets whereas 15 % focus on environmental targets 
alone. The distribution of the responses is presented in Figure 9. 
When it comes to financial targets, there is an even stronger emphasis: 73 % of the respondents 
state that they target market rate returns. There is a small minority targeting below market rate 
returns (15 %) but similarly there is also a minority targeting above market rate returns (12 %). 
This indicates that even though some private equity impact investors settle for lower returns, the 
clear majority aim for good financial returns. 
On the other hand, in Figure 11 it can be seen that almost half (46 %) of the respondents state that 
they are willing to compromise on their financial targets in some cases in order to maximize 
impact. The other half (46 %) note that they are not willing to budge at all from their financial 
targets even if it would increase the achieved impact. Only very few (8 %) are willing to do so in 
all cases. 
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Figure 9. Impact targets reported by survey respondents 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Financial targets reported by survey respondents 
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Figure 11. Survey respondents' willingness to compromise profits for impact 
In terms of modelling impacts before investing, the clear majority does use some formal methods 
to do that in all or at least some investment decisions as can be seen from Figure 12. Among them, 
the most popular method is theory of change (70 %), but self-developed modelling methods are 
also used by half of them. Only 12 % of the respondents state that they do not use any formal 
methods in modelling impact before investing and do not plan to do so in the future either (see 
Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 12. Survey respondents' use of impact modelling methods 
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Figure 13. Survey respondents' preferred modelling methods 
Those respondents who do use some impact modelling methods before investing, were also asked 
about their satisfaction of the modelling methods they use in terms of five aspects: time efficiency, 
cost efficiency, level of detail, sophistication and accuracy. Over half of the respondents are 
satisfied with all of these aspects of their modelling efforts. The aspect that they are the least 
satisfied about is accuracy of the modelling (see Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14. Survey respondents' satisfaction with their modelling methods 
Measuring impact after investing is even more common (see Figure 15). 88 % report that they 
measure impact in all cases. One of the respondents (4 %) does not currently use any measuring 
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methods but is planning on using them in the future. This respondent is a very new fund manager, 
who has just started operations and does not have any portfolio companies yet. One respondent 
does not use any impact measuring method and does not plan on it either. This GP reported that 
they rely solely on third-party evaluators in their impact measurement. 
Among those who do use some impact measuring methods themselves, own quantitative 
measuring methods are clearly the most popular. Qualitative methods are also used by over half 
of them. Out of the commonly known measurement methods SDGs and the IRIS are the most 
commonly used. IMP is preferred by 21 % and the GRI is referenced by 4 %. The rest of the 
measuring methods were not used by any of the survey respondents. The full distribution can be 
seen in Figure 16. 
Out of the respondents using some measuring methods, most are satisfied with their efforts. No 
one is unsatisfied with the time or money it takes to measure their impacts and only one 
respondent is unsatisfied with the level of detail in their measurement methods. The respondents 
are least satisfied with the accuracy and sophistication of the methods they use. The satisfaction 
rates for all aspects can be seen in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 15. Survey respondents' use of impact measuring methods (excluding third-party 
evaluators) 
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Figure 16. Survey respondents' preferred measuring methods 
 
 
Figure 17. Survey respondents' satisfaction with their measurement methods  
Third-party evaluators in impact measurement get a mixed review: 54 % report that they do not 
use any third-party evaluators, whereas 46 % use third-party evaluators in all or at least some 
cases. As all of the respondents except one, were either using measurement methods already or 
planning to measure impacts themselves, it is evident that third-party evaluators are used to 
supplement and enhance the GPs own measurement efforts instead of being a complete 
outsourcing option. The exact figures are presented in Figure 18. 
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Among those respondents who do use third-party evaluators, the satisfaction rates are very high 
in all aspects except for cost efficiency. However, even in terms of costs 58 % are either satisfied 
or very satisfied. The satisfaction rates in all aspects is presented in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 18. Survey respondents' use of third-party evaluators in impact measuring 
 
 
Figure 19. Survey respondents' satisfaction with their third-party impact evaluators 
Linking compensation to impact results is another subject that divides the fund managers: 58 % 
report that their compensation depends on impact in some way whereas 42 % receive their 
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compensation and fees regardless of the impact results achieved. This is an interesting division, 
since linking compensation to impact has not been studied in any previous studies and there isn’t 
much information available on how to implement it.  
Looking at the answers given in the free-text field, it is also evident that there aren’t any 
established methods of linking compensation to impact yet. Those who have linked their 
compensation to impact have implemented it in various different ways: for some, the 
compensation depends 50/50 on achieving impact targets and financial targets, some have a dual 
hurdle rate (financial and impact), some have arranged an annual funding scheme so that if impact 
targets are not achieved, additional funding is not granted, some receive a bonus if they achieve 
their impact targets and some are still just figuring out how exactly impact achievements will 
affect their compensation. Some respondents are part of European Investment Fund’s (EIF) Social 
Impact Accelerator (SIA) program, which requires all fund managers to have their compensation 
linked to impact depending on their impact KPIs. 
 
 
Figure 20. Survey respondents' compensation linking to impact 
The respondents were also asked about their opinions on the LP-GP relationship in an impact 
investing fund. Most feel that LPs are interested in impact matters and that the interest has 
increased in recent years. Furthermore, everyone agrees that it will only increase in the future. 
However, that interest doesn’t seem to translate to actual investment commitments quite yet as 
over 50 % disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that raising an impact fund is easier 
than raising a regular fund. Statements about LP motivations and conflicts of interest between 
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financial first and impact first LPs divide the opinions of the respondents. All of the opinions are 
presented in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21. Survey respondents' view on the LP-GP relationships in impact PE funds 
4.1.2.2 Deal sample characteristics 
The final sample includes 415 deals made by 19 European impact investors. 3 GPs that 
participated in the survey didn’t have any deals reported yet in either Preqin or Crunchbase. There 
are 246 deals that are classified as venture investments, 25 growth investments and 15 buyout 
investments. Deal type is not specified for 129 deals, which makes analyzing the 
representativeness of the sample quite challenging. All in all, it is clear that venture investments 
form the clear majority of the sample (see Figure 22). 
Comparing that to what the GPs announced as their investment focuses in the survey as presented 
in Figure 6, the responses and the reality are fairly aligned but there are also some differences. In 
the reported investment focuses there was a strong emphasis on venture deals (pre-seed, seed, 
early-stage venture and later-stage venture combined) whereas buyout or mezzanine investments 
were reported as an investment focus by only two GPs. This is in line with the actual deal sample. 
However, growth was reported as the most popular investment type in the survey by far: 19 
respondents out of 26 reported growth as one of their investment focuses whereas in the actual 
sample there are only 25 growth investments. Therefore, it is probable that either a large portion 
of the unspecified investments are actually growth investments, or if that’s not the case, then there 
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seems to be a lack of growth investment targets even though impact investors are keen to invest 
in them. 
 
Figure 22. Distribution of deals by investment type 
The sample of the deals is skewed also in other ways. Firstly, even though there are a few 
investments made before 2006 and a fairly large amount made in 2007-2013, the majority of deals 
are made in 2014 or after. This skewed distribution actually represents the overall growth trend 
of impact investing fairly well: impact investing was coined in 2007 and started gaining 
momentum a few years after that. In the last few years, it has grown and become a slightly more 
mature industry. Thus, the sample can be considered a good representation of impact investor 
portfolio companies. The full distribution of the deals by investment year is presented in Figure 
23. 
Secondly, as it can be seen from Figure 24, the distribution of the number of funding rounds is 
heavily dominated by the smaller values, which is typical for count data. Over half of the target 
companies have only had one funding round thus far. However, there is a long tail in the 
distribution going up to 17 funding rounds, which is also typical for count data.  
Contrarily to deal types, investment years and the number of funding rounds, the net impacts of 
the portfolio companies are fairly evenly distributed as can be seen in Figure 25. The vast majority 
of the net impact values fall between -20 and 40, with 0-20 being the most common range. 
However, the distribution is centered towards the higher net values, especially so by a small group 
of companies with exceptionally high net impact values between 180 and 200. These companies 
with net impacts over 180 are practically all lenders offering microloans to disadvantaged people.  
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The concentration of the values towards the higher end of the scale means that the portfolio 
companies in the sample represent a subset of companies that have a higher than average net 
impact. Therefore, it can be considered a good representation of impact investor portfolio 
companies as impact investors aim to find companies that have a net positive impact. 
 
 
Figure 23. Distribution of the sample by year of first investment by impact investor 
 
 
Figure 24. Distribution of the sample by number of funding rounds 
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Figure 25. Distribution of net impacts of the sample 
4.2 Regression analysis 
The main results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 6, which includes models 1 and 
2. In model 1 the relationships between net impact and the independent and control variables is 
examined with a clustered robust regression model. In model 2, the second-round variable is 
studied with regards to the independent and control variables using a logistic regression model. 
The first dependent variable of this study, the net impact of the portfolio companies, does not 
seem to correlate with any of the studied independent variables in a statistically significant way. 
However, among the control variables, some portfolio company industries correlate with net 
impact in some respects. Investments into companies in the education sector correlate positively 
with the achieved net impact on a p=0.02 significance level, while investments into food and 
agriculture, industrials and transportation, energy and utilities and real estate have a negative 
correlation with the net impact on p=0.02, p=0.02, p=0.05 and p=0.00 levels respectively. All of 
the industries were compared to the base category, which was consumer discretionary and 
business services. 
The second dependent variable examined in this study, financial performance, correlates with two 
of the independent variables: social targets and compensation. Firstly, in terms of impact targets, 
there is a negative correlation between having social targets and financial performance on a 
significance level of p=0.01. In other words, investments made with a social impact target seem 
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to have performed worse than those made with an environmental or dual target. Secondly, linking 
compensation to impact seems to correlate negatively with financial performance on a p=0.03 
significance level.  
Financial performance correlates also with some of the control variables. In terms of investment 
region, it seems that investments into Africa and Americas perform better in terms of the existence 
of a second round than the base category Europe. This could be due to small sample sizes in those 
regions as compared to Europe, where most of the investments were directed. Out of all the 
industries, investments into IT and healthcare sectors correlate positively with the existence of a 
second round on p=0.03 and p=0.02 levels. Regarding the investment year, investments made in 
2010-2014 perform worse than other time periods on a p=0.02 significance level. Moreover, VC 
investments correlate positively with the existence of a second round as compared to the other 
categories, which makes sense since follow-on funding rounds are more common in VC than in 
other types of investments. 
Table 6. Regression models 1 and 2 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Net impact  Second round  
 b/se p b/se p 
Impact target: Social -28.31 [0.14] -1.71 [0.01] 
 (18.43)  (0.70)  
Impact target: Environmental -21.34 [0.22] -0.89 [0.45] 
 (16.83)  (1.18)  
Financial target -3.58 [0.66] 0.82 [0.26] 
 (8.11)  (0.72)  
Financial compromise -0.35 [0.96] -0.29 [0.62] 
 (7.10)  (0.57)  
Modelling -3.18 [0.63] 0.81 [0.09] 
 (6.46)  (0.48)  
Measuring 6.44 [0.34] 0.33 [0.62] 
 (6.59)  (0.66)  
Third-party measuring 13.95 [0.15] 0.15 [0.74] 
 (9.38)  (0.45)  
Compensation -20.82 [0.22] -1.30 [0.03] 
 (16.52)  (0.60)  
Region: Africa 8.91 [0.54] 1.88 [0.00] 
 (14.14)  (0.60)  
Region: Americas 1.07 [0.66] 0.68 [0.03] 
 (2.36)  (0.32)  
Region: Asia 6.91 [0.31] 0.92 [0.13] 
 (6.57)  (0.61)  
Industry: IT 4.89 [0.59] 1.37 [0.03] 
 (8.99)  (0.65)  
Industry: Marketing & Telecoms -18.00 [0.06] 0.90 [0.38] 
 (8.93)  (1.03)  
Industry: Industrials & Transportation -24.38 [0.02] 0.97 [0.15] 
 (9.27)  (0.68)  
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Industry: Energy & Utilities -22.95 [0.05] 0.43 [0.41] 
 (10.98)  (0.52)  
Industry: Food & Agriculture -30.32 [0.02] -0.37 [0.50] 
 (11.31)  (0.55)  
Industry: Healthcare 5.56 [0.42] 1.39 [0.02] 
 (6.67)  (0.59)  
Industry: Education 26.43 [0.02] 1.17 [0.20] 
 (10.46)  (0.92)  
Industry: Real Estate -19.64 [0.00] 0.51 [0.45] 
 (4.45)  (0.68)  
Year: 2010-2014 7.84 [0.26] -0.83 [0.02] 
 (6.76)  (0.37)  
Year: 2015-2019 2.41 [0.65] -0.35 [0.38] 
 (5.23)  (0.40)  
Deal stage: VC -3.43 [0.29] 1.09 [0.01] 
 (3.16)  (0.42)  
Deal stage: Growth 3.42 [0.68] 0.91 [0.11] 
 (8.23)  (0.57)  
Deal stage: Buyout 24.19 [0.27]   
 (21.03)    
Constant 27.15 [0.45] -4.19 [0.15] 
 (35.51)  (2.93)  
N 415  334  
In addition to the statistical significances, it is also important to study effect sizes. Even though 
model 1 didn’t reveal many significant correlations, the average marginal effects of the 
independent variables on net impact in model 1 are very large as can be seen in Figure 26. 
Especially for the social and environmental target variables and the compensation variable, the 
effect sizes are extremely large; more than -20. As the social and environmental targets are 
compared against the baseline of having both targets, this indicates that having both kinds of 
impact targets seems to outperform focusing on only one kind of impact target in terms of net 
impact achieved. On the other hand, the 95 % confidence intervals of those effect sizes are also 
very large, which makes them less reliable. 
Additionally, there are also other variables that have large average marginal effects in the model. 
Using some measuring methods has an average marginal effect of over 5 and using third-party 
measuring has an effect of more than 10. However, both of their confidence intervals are fairly 
narrow, which increase their importance. 
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Figure 26. Average marginal effects and confidence intervals for prediction of net impact 
The average marginal effects in model 2 for the second-round variable are not nearly as big as for 
net impact, but still there are quite many that are notable as can be seen in Figure 27. Firstly, the 
two variables that showed statistically significant correlations in the regression analysis – having 
social targets and linking compensation to impact – have also large effect sizes of more than -2. 
Both of their confidence intervals are also entirely below zero, which reinforces the findings of 
the regression analysis that these two variables are very likely to have a negative correlation with 
the occurrence of a second funding round. Having environmental targets as compared to having 
both social and environmental targets also has an average marginal effect of more than -1.5, but 
the confidence interval of that is so wide that very reliable conclusions cannot be drawn from that. 
Secondly, having high financial targets and using some modelling methods have a fairly large 
effect on the existence of a second round, with fairly narrow confidence intervals: both have an 
average marginal effect of over 1.5 and the confidence intervals stay almost completely above 
zero. Thus, it is quite likely that they have a positive effect on the occurrence of a second round. 
The other independent variables have quite small average marginal effects on the second-round 
variable, and therefore they are not as meaningful. 
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Figure 27. Average marginal effects and confidence intervals for prediction of second round 
In order study that there is no multicollinearity in the model, an analysis of the variance inflation 
factors of the variables in model is also conducted. The average of the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) of all the variables used in model 1 is 2.81, which can be considered acceptable. However, 
regarding the impact and financial target variables the VIFs are quite high. Still as all values are 
under 10, there aren’t likely any major multicollinearity issues in the model. The VIFs for all of 
the variables used in model 1 are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. Variance inflation factors in model 1 
 Model 1 
 Net impact 
 VIF 
Impact target: Social 3.90186 
Impact target: Environmental 7.186234 
Financial target 8.323383 
Financial compromise 5.217407 
Modelling 2.26997 
Measuring 3.46067 
Third-party measuring 1.801015 
Compensation 3.250926 
Region: Africa 3.023306 
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Region: Americas 1.108622 
Region: Asia 1.351903 
Industry: IT 2.378629 
Industry: Marketing & Telecoms 1.25459 
Industry: Industrials & Transportation 1.395314 
Industry: Energy & Utilities 1.772516 
Industry: Food & Agriculture 2.603253 
Industry: Healthcare 1.927837 
Industry: Education 1.651376 
Industry: Real Estate 1.243667 
Year: 2010-2014 3.60739 
Year: 2015-2019 4.008931 
Stage: VC 2.106137 
Stage: Growth 1.27452 
Stage: Buyout 1.244609 
Constant  
Mean VIF 2.806836 
 
In addition to the main models presented in Table 6, additional analyses of the specific measuring 
methods and modelling methods were performed on subsets of the total sample including only 
those deals in which some modelling or measuring methods were used. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 8 for modelling methods and in Table 9 for measuring methods. 
Same kind of regression models were used in studying modelling and measuring methods as the 
ones used in the main analysis: a clustered robust regression for net impact and a logistic 
regression for the second-round variable. 
In terms of the specific impact modelling methods it seems that none of them have a significant 
correlation with impact performance. Nonetheless, it seems that the use of own modelling 
methods somewhat increases the financial performance at a p-level of p=0.00 as can be seen in 
Table 8. There are also several significant correlations between the dependent variables and the 
control variables in models 3 and 4. 
Table 8. Regression models 3 and 4 
 Model 3  Model 4  
 Net impact  Second round  
 b/se p b/se p 
Theory of change 0.66 [0.95] 0.57 [0.23] 
 (10.04)  (0.48)  
Other common methods -2.71 [0.45] -0.21 [0.47] 
 (3.48)  (0.29)  
Own methods -0.18 [0.95] 1.97 [0.00] 
 (2.83)  (0.20)  
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Region: Africa -0.29 [0.98] 0.50 [0.42] 
 (10.25)  (0.62)  
Region: Americas -2.56 [0.34] 0.33 [0.41] 
 (2.61)  (0.40)  
Region: Asia 13.22 [0.20] 1.16 [0.12] 
 (9.82)  (0.75)  
Industry: IT 2.02 [0.88] 1.11 [0.11] 
 (12.78)  (0.69)  
Industry: Marketing & Telecoms -20.02 [0.12] 0.86 [0.46] 
 (12.32)  (1.15)  
Industry: Industrials & Transportation -27.49 [0.07] 0.80 [0.27] 
 (14.23)  (0.73)  
Industry: Energy & Utilities -22.10 [0.14] 0.67 [0.26] 
 (14.37)  (0.59)  
Industry: Food & Agriculture -32.04 [0.06] -0.67 [0.36] 
 (16.05)  (0.72)  
Industry: Healthcare 1.04 [0.92] 0.83 [0.18] 
 (10.86)  (0.62)  
Industry: Education 20.63 [0.15] 0.60 [0.51] 
 (13.77)  (0.90)  
Industry: Real Estate -25.83 [0.01] 0.44 [0.50] 
 (8.95)  (0.64)  
Year: 2010-2014 11.64 [0.15] -0.84 [0.01] 
 (7.69)  (0.31)  
Year: 2015-2019 7.05 [0.15] -0.42 [0.24] 
 (4.60)  (0.35)  
Deal stage: VC 3.60 [0.19] 1.10 [0.00] 
 (2.59)  (0.27)  
Deal stage: Growth 2.55 [0.76] 0.94 [0.09] 
 (8.10)  (0.55)  
Deal stage: Buyout 24.10 [0.31]   
 (22.99)    
Constant 17.86 [0.31] -2.05 [0.03] 
 (16.83)  (0.92)  
N 398  323  
Regarding the specific impact measuring methods there are some correlations with both impact 
performance and financial performance as can be seen in Table 9. Firstly, the use of the GRI or 
SDG framework and using qualitative measuring methods correlate positively with the net impact 
of the portfolio companies on p=0.05, p=0.03 and p=0.04 significance levels. Secondly, the use 
of the SDG framework and the IMP framework correlate negatively with financial performance 
on p=0.00 significance levels.  
Table 9. Regression models 5 and 6 
 Model 5  Model 6  
 Net impact  Second round  
 b/se p b/se p 
IRIS -32.10 [0.11] 0.10 [0.79] 
 (19.14)  (0.37)  
GRI 81.87 [0.05] -0.92 [0.19] 
 (39.48)  (0.71)  
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SDG 47.29 [0.03] -0.80 [0.00] 
 (20.52)  (0.26)  
IMP -9.32 [0.18] -1.69 [0.00] 
 (6.60)  (0.15)  
Own methods 41.93 [0.07] -0.43 [0.57] 
 (21.70)  (0.77)  
Qualitative methods 10.92 [0.04] 0.14 [0.80] 
 (4.87)  (0.56)  
Region: Africa -9.44 [0.19] -0.51 [0.24] 
 (6.97)  (0.44)  
Region: Americas -0.47 [0.84] 0.31 [0.39] 
 (2.29)  (0.36)  
Region: Asia 6.90 [0.34] 0.69 [0.25] 
 (7.01)  (0.60)  
Industry: IT 4.99 [0.59] 1.44 [0.07] 
 (9.20)  (0.80)  
Industry: Marketing & Telecoms -12.22 [0.08] 0.98 [0.42] 
 (6.45)  (1.22)  
Industry: Industrials & Transportation -21.60 [0.02] 0.71 [0.34] 
 (8.54)  (0.74)  
Industry: Energy & Utilities -12.60 [0.17] 0.54 [0.42] 
 (8.70)  (0.68)  
Industry: Food & Agriculture -24.57 [0.02] -0.96 [0.16] 
 (9.72)  (0.67)  
Industry: Healthcare 5.41 [0.33] 1.08 [0.10] 
 (5.36)  (0.66)  
Industry: Education 23.07 [0.03] 0.96 [0.35] 
 (9.93)  (1.01)  
Industry: Real Estate -18.73 [0.00] 0.57 [0.37] 
 (4.15)  (0.63)  
Year: 2010-2014 8.61 [0.25] -0.88 [0.02] 
 (7.23)  (0.39)  
Year: 2015-2019 3.86 [0.37] -0.51 [0.14] 
 (4.21)  (0.35)  
Deal stage: VC -2.23 [0.44] 1.43 [0.00] 
 (2.83)  (0.37)  
Deal stage: Growth 3.58 [0.68] 0.88 [0.12] 
 (8.44)  (0.57)  
Deal stage: Buyout 21.99 [0.32]   
 (21.67)    
Constant -29.18 [0.11] 0.38 [0.69] 
 (17.29)  (0.94)  
N 403  327  
 
Based on the results of the regression analyses presented in Table 6 for the main findings, Table 
8 for modelling methods and Table 9 for measuring methods as well as the average marginal 
effect analyses, it can be concluded that some of the hypotheses outlined in section 2.5 are not 
supported while some are supported partially. 
Firstly, H1 is not supported by the results, since targeting higher returns does not seem to affect 
the impact performance nor the financial performance of investments. Furthermore, not being 
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willing to compromise on financial targets in any situation does not correlate significantly with 
either of the dependent variables. 
Secondly, the results show no evidence that targeting only social or environmental impacts would 
lead to better financial or impact results than targeting both. In fact, there is some contrary support 
that targeting only social impacts could decrease the financial performance and according to the 
average marginal effect analysis having social or environmental targets has a negative effect on 
net impact as compared to having both targets. Also, there does not seem to be any indication that 
targeting social or environmental impacts would lead to better financial or impact performance 
than the other. Therefore, H2, H3 and H4 are not supported by the results. 
Thirdly, the use of modelling or measuring methods per se does not seem to correlate with the 
financial or impact results of the investments in the main regression models. However, there are 
some signals in the additional regression models that some specific methods might affect the 
performance in some ways. Using own modelling methods seems to increase the financial 
performance. Moreover, in the average marginal effect analysis, modelling in general also seemed 
to have a positive effect on financial performance. Thus, hypothesis 5 is partially supported by 
the results – modelling might improve financial performance, but it does not seem to affect impact 
results. 
Furthermore, using the GRI or SDG frameworks or some qualitative methods to measure the 
achieved impact seems to increase the achieved net impact. On the other hand, using the SDG or 
IMP frameworks decreases the financial performance according to the additional regression 
model. So, the results are quite conflicted and thus hypothesis 6 is supported only partially – some 
measuring methods might improve the net impact of investments while others could decrease the 
financial performance of investments. 
Finally, linking compensation to some impact targets or results does not seem to have any 
statistically significant results in terms of the impact performance of investments. Regarding the 
financial performance however, the results from the logistic regression model and the average 
marginal effect analysis indicate that linking impact to compensation could in fact decrease the 
financial performance of investments as measured by the occurrence of a second funding round. 
Hence, H7 is not supported by the results in any way. 
A summary of the hypothesis results in terms of the regression analyses is presented in Table 10. 
However, as a concluding remark, it is important to keep in mind when interpreting these results 
that due to the relatively small sample size, the newness of the phenomenon and the general lack 
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of previous studies on impact investing in, the results are only indicative and therefore the 
hypotheses cannot be considered comprehensively validated based on these results alone.  
Table 10. Summary of hypothesis results 
No. Hypothesis Result 
H1 Targeting higher returns improves the financial and impact 
performance of investments. 
Not supported 
H2 Targeting only environmental or social impacts instead of both 
improves the financial and impact performance of investments. 
Not supported 
H3 Targeting environmental impacts improves the financial performance 
of investments. 
Not supported 
H4 Targeting social impacts improves the impact performance of 
investments. 
Not supported 
H5 Modelling impact improves the investments’ financial and impact 
performance. 
Partially supported 
H6 Measuring impact improves the investments’ financial and impact 
performance. 
Partially supported 
H7 Tying fund manager compensation to impact targets improves the 
investments’ financial and impact performance. 
Not supported 
 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
5.1 Discussion of the results 
This aim of this study was to gain insight on the impact investing industry especially from the 
point of view of private equity investors. As impact investing is a fairly new phenomenon among 
the private equity industry, it hasn’t been studied extensively yet. Therefore, the research 
questions of this study were focused on addressing the most prominent unresolved questions and 
challenges that impact investing faces: 1) the definition of impact investing, 2) the financial and 
impact targets of impact investors, 3) the impact modelling and measuring methods that are used, 
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4) the GP-LP relationship and the extent to which GP compensation depends on impact results 
and finally 5) how all of these affect the financial and impact performance of investments. 
The theoretical part of the study was a literature review that aimed to address the first four research 
questions. Regarding the definition of impact investing, it was found that most definitions are 
fairly aligned and that there is a unanimous understanding of the core elements of impact 
investing. Practically all definitions state that impact investing is about targeting both financial 
returns and positive social or environmental impacts. The level of ambition in the financial targets 
is not limited in any way, as long as there are some financial targets, which set it apart from 
charity. Furthermore, most definitions additionally include the requirements of intentionality and 
measurability meaning that the investments need to be made to intentionally target positive 
impacts and that the impacts need to be measurable and verifiable in some way (Bell, 2013; Bugg-
Levine & Emerson, 2011; Clarkin & Cangioni, 2016; Combs, 2014; Hebb, 2013; Höchstädter & 
Scheck, 2014; O'Donohoe et al., 2010; Roundy et al., 2017). 
Based on the literature, disagreement and debate on the definition focuses mostly on profitability 
and additionality. Some critics question the viability of generating market rate returns while 
creating positive impacts that would not have happened anyway. Therefore, the critics feel that 
the definition that allows any level of financial returns is not feasible, because there is an 
inevitable trade-off between impact added by the investor and financial returns (Brest & Born, 
2013; Evans, 2013). 
Additionally, it was found that even though the terms are sometimes used interchangeably 
responsible investing, ESG investing and similar concepts differ clearly from impact investing. 
The major differences are that whereas the approach in responsible investing and others is to avoid 
doing harm and minimizing the harm that is currently done, impact investing is all about 
maximizing the positive impact and searching for companies that do good, instead of those that 
do the least amount of bad possible (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011; FVCA, Sitra, & Deloitte, 
2017; Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014; Roundy et al., 2017). 
The third research question was focused on finding out what impact modelling and measuring 
methods there are available to investors. It was found that impact modelling has not induced a lot 
of research nor attention of the practitioners, even though it can be considered an extremely 
important aspect in impact investing. Especially in social impact bonds (SIB), careful modelling 
of the expected impacts was found to be crucial for the success of the operation (Männistö, 2016). 
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However, regarding impact modelling methods, there aren’t many options to choose from. Theory 
of change is practically the only method that was mentioned in literature. 
Contrarily to impact modelling, it was found that there is a myriad of different impact measuring 
methods. The IRIS metrics have been created by the GIIN and are therefore regarded by many as 
the industry standard. Besides IRIS, the following impact measurement methods were mentioned 
in the literature review: GIIRS, SROI, SDG, IMP and several responsible investing metrics. All 
of these methods rely on bottom-up thinking and finding the right metrics for each case. They are 
flexible and allow for a lot of tailoring, which makes them hard to compare. In addition to these 
findings, the Upright Project was discovered through discussions.  Unlike the others, the Upright 
method is top-down focused and science-based. It produces highly comparable values, and the 
only tailoring that is allowed is adjusting the weighting of the values. 
Finally, regarding the fourth research question the literature review addressed some special 
characteristics of PE and how they affect impact investing. It was found that regarding GP 
compensations the PE industry is quite set in its ways: GP compensation is in most cases 
structured in exactly the same way consisting of a management fee of around 2 % and a carried 
interest of about 20 %, which makes it challenging for impact focused GPs to suggest other 
structures to profit sharing (Litvak, 2009; Metrick & Yasuda, 2010; Robinson & Sensoy, 2013; 
Sahlman, 1990; Schmidt & Wahrenburg, 2003). 
The empirical part of the study was used to test and further clarify the findings from the literature 
review and to answer the fifth research question. The survey answers provide some insights to the 
first four research question and the regression analysis made with the combined data from the 
survey and the portfolio data from the databases focuses on the fifth research question. 
From the survey responses it can be concluded that PE impact investors agree to a large extent 
with the definition of impact investing that was found in the literature review. Everyone agreed 
on the core elements of the definition, but the more detailed requirements of intentionality and 
measurability raised some disagreement among the respondents as well. Regarding the related 
terms such as socially responsible investing and ESG investing, there was also a quite clear 
understanding that they are not synonyms for impact investing. 
Regarding the targets of the GPs, a clear majority targeted at market rate returns but there were 
two smaller minorities that opted for either below or above market rate returns. Half of the 
respondents were however willing to compromise on the financial targets in some cases while 
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half were not willing to do so in any cases. Having social targets was a bit more common than 
environmental targets but on the other hand about half of all respondents targeted both. 
Impact modelling was done by most respondents and most of them used theory of change. 
However, own modelling methods were also used by many. Impact measuring was done by a 
clear majority and among the commonly available methods IRIS and the SDG framework were 
used the most. However, the majority also used their own measuring methods and over half also 
reported using qualitative methods to measure their impacts. Most of the respondents were also 
quite satisfied with all aspects of their impact modelling and measuring efforts. 
Finally, regarding the GP-LP relationship, it was found that even though most feel that LPs are 
interested in impact matters and that that interest is only going to increase, there are still 
challenges in raising impact focused funds. In terms of compensations, a bit over half of all 
respondents have their compensation linked to impact in some way whereas the rest don’t. The 
implementation of the link between impact and compensation was arranged in various ways 
ranging from a strict policy of 50 % of total compensation depending on achieving impact targets 
to impact performance affecting bonuses in some way. 
After linking the survey responses to the portfolio companies invested in by each respondent, the 
regression analysis was conducted to test the hypotheses and to answer the fifth research question 
as a whole. It was found that having social targets might decrease the financial performance of 
investments as opposed to having both social and environmental targets. Also, it was found that 
linking GP compensation to the achieved impacts might decrease the financial performance of 
investments. 
Regarding impact modelling it was found that the use of modelling methods before investing, and 
especially methods created by the investors themselves, might increase financial performance. In 
terms of impact measuring, it was found that the use of some measuring methods can lead to 
higher net impact while others could decrease the financial performance. Specifically, the use of 
SDGs or the GRI as a measuring framework as well as using qualitative methods to measure 
impact were found to increase net impact while simultaneously, the use of SDGs or the IMP 
framework seemed to decrease financial performance. It could be concluded that perhaps using 
less detailed impact measuring methods are still more efficient in impact measuring than very 
detailed metrics but that they can also compromise the financial profits. The development of more 
accurate and comprehensive impact measuring methods could change this in the future though. 
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Furthermore, it was found that in some industries a higher net impact score seems to be easier to 
achieve than in others. Especially education sector, which can be considered more as a social 
impact sector than an environmental one, scored highly in the Upright model, whereas more 
environment-related sectors such as food and agriculture, energy and utilities, industrials and 
transportation and real estate scored poorly in the model. The Upright model considers three 
aspects that can be regarded as more social (health, society and knowledge) and only one aspect 
that is environmental and they were all given equal weights, which might be one explanation as 
to why the social enterprises scored better. 
5.2 Implications 
This study has many practical implications as it is the first study that evaluates the performance 
of impact investments in private equity. The implications are relevant for three groups: 1) GPs 
who either have an impact fund or aim to have one in the future, 2) LPs looking for the best impact 
funds and 3) academics studying impact investing. 
For the GPs the implications can be divided into two categories. Firstly, for those planning their 
first impact fund, the findings of the literature review and the survey results act as a good 
benchmarking guide on how to create an impact fund in practice, what kind of targets can be set, 
what modelling and measuring tools there are and what do others use, how can compensation be 
arranged etc. The survey results also highlight the growing importance and interest towards 
impact investing from the LPs’ side, which makes it a relevant consideration for all GPs. 
Secondly, the results of the regression analysis, provide some insight into which methods and 
practices lead to the best results. It might be more advisable to aim for both kinds of impacts than 
to focus solely on social targets and to not link the compensation to achieved impacts just yet as 
there aren’t any best practices on how to do it yet. Additionally, when choosing which impact 
measuring methods to use, the GP should note that a simple method such as tracking the 
Sustainable Development Goals might be more useful than a more complex method. However, it 
is too early to recommend any measuring method over others as the methods are constantly 
improving and new methods are being developed. 
For the LPs, the implications are simple, yet significant. Impact investing is maturing fast and 
there is an increasing amount of impact-focused private equity funds for the LPs to choose from. 
It is good to keep an open mind in terms of different GP compensation structures even though 
they differ from the norm. LPs can also shape the impact investing industry by setting new 
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standards to it and demanding more measuring and setting ambitious financial and impact targets 
for the GPs that increase their net impact. 
Finally, for the academics, this study is a starting point for future impact investing studies. All of 
the findings of the regression models need to be further investigated to understand the phenomena 
fully. As more sophisticated impact measuring methods emerge and as the impact funds report 
their actual financials, the analysis can be continued on a more detailed level. 
5.3 Reliability and validity 
The reliability of a study is measured in the extent to which the study can be repeated with the 
same results (Heale & Twycross, 2015). In the case of a quantitative study, this depends largely 
on the extent to which the chosen variables measure the intended outcome in a consistent manner. 
In this study, the two dependent variables, impact and financial performance, were measured with 
net impact values from Upright and the existence of a second round of funding, which is derived 
from the overall number of funding rounds. The net impact values are a very consistent metric 
and they can be accessed freely by anyone on the Upright website. Thus, the results related to net 
impact can be considered reliable. The financial performance was measured with the overall 
occurrence of a second round as other generally used metrics of financial performance were not 
available. The occurrence of a second funding round has been used as a performance metric in 
similar situations in previous studies (Ter Wal et al., 2016) and so, it can be considered reliable 
as well.  
The validity of a quantitative study is measured in terms of internal and external validity. Internal 
validity means the extent to which the causal relationships are valid i.e. that the variations in the 
dependent variables are indeed caused by the independent variables and not by other factors  
(Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). Control variables also play an important role in capturing the full nature 
of the correlations. 
As the performance of impact investing in terms of net impact or financial results has not been 
studied previously, there wasn’t much foundation from which to select the most relevant 
independent variables. Thus, the group of independent variables was selected to be quite broad in 
order to not miss any significant correlations. The selected control variables also support this 
objective. However, the possible endogeneity of the independent variables was not studied and 
therefore, the internal validity cannot be completely assured. 
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External validity on the other hand means the extent to which conclusions can be drawn from the 
results and how well they can be generalized to other samples, time periods and environments. 
Therefore, external validity can be threatened by biases in the sample population, by dependence 
of the point in time in which the study was conducted and by biases in the environment or setting 
of the study (Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). 
The first concern related to population bias is somewhat relevant in this case. Even though the 
total population was collected from several public sources and the process of forming the 
population is carefully explained in chapter 3, the final sample of 22 private equity firms is 
relatively small and therefore, the results might not be generalizable to other samples from the 
population. As discussed in section 3.1, even though the different countries were fairly well 
represented in the sample as compared to the total population, VC and growth investors were 
overrepresented in the sample. Thus, it is possible that the sample is somewhat biased and does 
not represent opinions and practices of the total population completely.  
The second concern about time dependency is also fairly valid in this study. As impact investing 
is a nascent industry, it is probable that the methods and practices used by impact investors evolve 
and develop as time passes and that the investors themselves get better at what they are doing. 
Thus, it is possible that in the future a similar study might lead to overall higher impact results 
and better financial performance, which in turn might reveal more about the differences between 
different modelling and measuring methods etc.  
Thirdly, also the concern about environmental generalizability is a relevant concern in this case. 
As the scope is limited to European GPs, the results might not be replicable in other geographical 
regions. Also, since the sample consists mostly of VC investments, the results might not be 
applicable to other investment types.  
5.4 Limitations and further research 
As most studies do, this study also has its limitations. First of all, as the scope was limited to 
European PE impact investors, the results are not directly generalizable to other regions or to 
other asset classes.  Furthermore, the sample consisted mostly of VC investments with only a few 
buyout and growth investments in the mix. The results might look a bit different with a buyout or 
growth focused sample. 
Additionally, the survey sample is likely to be slightly biased also in other ways than the VC 
investors’ overrepresentation. As the message that was sent to the GPs mentioned that the survey 
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focuses on impact definition, modelling, measuring and compensation practices, it is likely that it 
interested those who do use some modelling, measuring or compensation methods more than the 
others. On the other hand, as it was also mentioned in the message that the results will be shared 
with all respondents and that the aim of the study is to produce benchmarking data, it might have 
interested GPs who feel that they need to improve their practices. In fact, a few respondents had 
just started their operations and were likely intrigued by the promise of benchmarking data. 
In the data collection process, some personal reminders were also sent to selected GPs to which I 
had some connection through my personal network. That might have influenced the final sample 
of the survey respondents as well.  
These limitations form some of the potential topics for future research. Firstly, it would be 
interesting to study investors in other regions to see if the methods and practices used by them 
differ from the European sample. Secondly, it would be interesting to study whether these results 
could be replicated on other samples e.g. buyout investment focused samples. 
Furthermore, as the impact performance of the investments didn’t show any statistically 
significant correlations with the independent variables in this study, it remains an interesting topic 
for future research. Impact investments could also be compared to traditional PE investments to 
study the differences between them in terms of financial performance and impact. Moreover, as 
the impact funds mature and liquidate their funds to the LPs, the financial performance can be 
studied to a much deeper extent as well in order to further validate the initial findings of this study. 
As a conclusion, as impact investing is a fairly new phenomena, a lot of future research is needed 
to understand the causal relationships behind the methods and practices applied by impact 
investors. Specifically, impact investing in private equity requires more research as to my 
knowledge this is the first study about impact investing that focuses on private equity.  
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